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Abstract
The policy response to the recent ﬁnancial crisis has broadly focused on two themes: 1) Increas-
ing the banking sectors’ resilience to future ﬁnancial shocks: 2) Improving credit availability
to households and ﬁrms via lowering both short and long-term interest rates and thereby
affecting short-term output and inﬂation. This dissertation studies how banks and ﬁrms have
responded to these policy measures. The dissertation comprises of three chapters. The ﬁrst
two analyze the impact of capital regulation on bank lending for two different jurisdictions -
United States and Switzerland. The third evaluates the response of U.S. non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms to
lower interest rates.
The ﬁrst chapter is joint work with Luisa Lambertini. We estimate the impact of bank
capital regulation on lending spreads. We use U.S. ﬁrm-level data on syndicated loans matched
with Bank Holding Company (BHC) data for the lending banks in our panel regressions. We
ﬁnd that higher bank capital leads to an increase in the loan pricing. Further, we investigate
if stress test failure under the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program and Comprehensive
Capital Analysis and Review leads to higher loan spreads, since ﬁnancial institutions that failed
were required to raise capital in the short run. Using a difference-in-difference framework, we
ﬁnd: 1) BHCs that failed the stress tests increased their loan pricing; 2) Loan pricing is higher
for all banks after the commencement of the stress tests. These ﬁndings suggest that greater
regulatory oversight and higher capital requirements have made syndicated loans more costly
for ﬁrms.
The second chapter is joint work with Luisa Lambertini, Dan Wunderli and Robert
Bichsel. We use conﬁdential loan-by-loan data of Swiss banks to study the impact of higher
capital requirements on lending. Our data allows us to trace the link between bank capital
and new credit granted at the bank level. Additionally bank-speciﬁc variation of capital targets
allows us to analyze how deviation from the regulatory capital target impacts loan pricing and
volume. We ﬁnd that tighter capital regulation has small but statistically signiﬁcant short-term
vii
Abstract
effects on loan pricing and growth. We do not ﬁnd a permanent effect of higher capital ratios
on loan growth.
In the third chapter, I study the behavior of U.S. non-ﬁnancial corporates after the
recent ﬁnancial crisis. I document an increase in the real debt holdings and correspondingly
the book leverage for these ﬁrms. Controlling for ﬁrm- and time- ﬁxed effects, I ﬁnd a higher
long-term debt to asset ratio to be associated with lower capital expenditures and growth in
ﬁxed capital post-crisis. This is also true for ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms, as determined by
the Whited-Wu index, vis-a-vis pre-crisis. Moreover, ﬁrms with a higher share of long-term
debt after the crisis appear to have a greater likelihood of repurchasing shares and larger dollar
payouts to equity holders. The evidence points to the fact that any increase in long-term debt
has had an impact on ﬁrms’ capital structure but no positive effect on real investment.
Key words: Bank capital; Lending; Capital Requirements; Syndicated Loans; Stress-testing;
Interest Rates; Capital Structure; Corporate Investment; Share Repurchases.
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Zusammenfassung
Die ﬁnanz- und geldpolitische Antwort auf die jüngste Finanzkrise hat sich vor allem auf
zwei Bereiche fokussiert: 1) Verbesserung der Widerstandsfähigkeit der Banken bezüglich
zukünftiger Schocks an den Finanzmärkten 2) Verbesserung der Kreditverfügbarkeit für Haus-
halte und Firmen durch eine Reduktion der kurz- und langfristigen Zinssätze, und dem damit
verbundenen kurzfristigen Einﬂuss auf die Wirtschaftsleistung und Inﬂation. Diese Doktorar-
beit analysiert wie Banken und Unternehmen auf die implementierten Massnahmen reagiert
haben und beinhaltet drei Kapitel. Die ersten beiden Kapitel analysieren den Einﬂuss der
Eigenkapitalregulierung auf die Kreditvergabe von Banken für zwei unterschiedliche Länder:
Die USA und die Schweiz. Das dritte Kapitel evaluiert die Reaktion von amerikanischen Firmen
auf niedrigere Zinssätze.
Das erste Kapitel ist gemeinschaftliche Arbeit mit Luisa Lambertini. We schätzen den
Einﬂuss der Eigenkapitalregulierung für Banken auf die Zinsspanne der Kredite. Wir verwen-
den einen Längsschnittdatensatz, welcher Informationen zu Konsortialkrediten auf Fimene-
bene für amerikanische Unternehmen sowie der kreditvergebenden Banken (BHC) beinhaltet.
Die Ergebnisse unserer Analyse zeigen, dass höhere Eigenkapitalanforderungen zu einer Er-
höhung der Kreditpreise führt. Darüber hinaus untersuchen wir, ob das Nichtbestehen von
Stresstests unter dem “Supervisory Capital Assessment Program and Comprehensive Capital
Analysis and Review” zu höheren Zinsspannen der Kredite führt. Zugrunde liegt hier die über-
legung, dass Finanzinstitute, welche den Stresstest nicht bestehen, gezwungen werden ihr
Eigenkapital kurzfristig zu erhöhen. Mithilfe einer Difference-in-difference Methodologie do-
kumentieren wir folgende Ergebnisse: 1) BHCs, welche den Stresstest nicht bestanden haben,
erhöhten ihre Kreditpreise 2) Die Kreditpreise sind höher für alle Banken seit der Einführung
der Stresstests. Unsere Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass eine grössere regulatorische Präsenz
und höhere Eigenkapitalvoraussetzungen die Kosten für Konsortialkredite für Firmen erhöht
haben.
Das zweite Kapitel ist gemeinschaftliche Arbeit mit Luisa Lambertini, Dan Wunderli
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und Robert Bichsel. Wir verwenden vertrauliche Kreditdaten über Schweizer Banken, um
den Einﬂuss von höheren Eigenkapitalmindestanforderungen auf die Kreditvergabetätigkeit
zu untersuchen. Unser Datensatz erlaubt die Herstellung einer Verbindung zwischen Ban-
kenkapital und neu ausgegebenen Krediten auf Bankenebene. Zusätzliche bankspeziﬁsche
Variation der Kapitalanforderungen ermöglicht es zu analysieren, wie die Abweichung von den
regulatorisch vorgegebenen Kapitalanforderungen die Kreditpreise und das Kreditvolumen
beeinﬂusst. Die Analyse zeigt, dass striktere Kapitalregulierung einen kleinen aber statistisch
signiﬁkanten Einﬂuss auf die Kreditpreise und das Kreditwachstum hat. Wir ﬁnden jedoch
keinen dauerhaften Effekt von erhöhtem Eigenkapital auf das Kreditwachstum.
Im dritten Kapital untersuche ich das Verhalten von amerikanischen Firmen, welche
nicht dem Finanzsektor angehören, auf die kürzliche Finanzkrise. Ich dokumentiere eine Erhö-
hung des realen Schuldenstands und des Verschuldungsgrads für diese Firmen. Kontrollierend
für speziﬁsche Firmen- und Zeiteffekte (ﬁxed effects), zeigt die Analyse einen höheren Ver-
schuldungsgrad, geringere Investmenttätigkeit sowie langsameres Wachstum in langfristigen
Anlagen nach der Finanzkrise.
Dies betrifft auch solche Firmen mit solider Finanzsituation gemäss dem Whited-Wu
Index. Darüber hinaus zeigen Firmen mit einem höheren Anteil von langfristigen Schulden
nach der Krise eine erhöhte Neigung für Aktienrückkäufe, und in diesem Zusammenhang
werden höhere Zahlungen an die veräussernden Anteilsbesitzer geleistet. Dieses Ergebnis stellt
einen Hinweis dar, dass jeglicher Anstieg in den langfristigen Schulden zugleich einen Einﬂuss
auf die Firmenkapitalstruktur hat, jedoch nicht auf die tatsächliche Investitionstätigkeit.
Schlüsselwörter: Kreditvergabe von Banken, Eigenkapitalanforderungen, Konsortialkredite,
Stresstests, Zinssätze, Kapitalstruktur, Investitionstätigkeit von Unternehmen, Aktienrückkäu-
fe.
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Introduction
The aftermath of the recent ﬁnancial crisis has witnessed a wave of ﬁnancial regulation and
monetary policy actions. Financial regulation has aimed at making the banking sector more
resilient to future ﬁnancial shocks. Monetary policy measures have been focused on improving
credit availability to ﬁrms and households via a lowering of short- and long-term interest rates.
It is important to understand how these measures affect the real economy. This dissertation
investigates: 1) The effect of higher bank capital on lending to non-ﬁnancial corporates; 2)
The ﬁnancing and investment behavior of non-ﬁnancial corporates after the crisis.
The crisis of 2007: The bursting of the housing bubble in 2007 has led to a global
recession of a magnitude not witnessed since the Great Depression in the 1930s. As a direct
consequence of the mortgage delinquencies, banks had to write down billions of dollars in bad
loans. Huge losses incurred by the banking sector raised concerns about the banks’ ability to
withstand the crisis causing creditors and holders of uninsured deposits to withdraw and stop
rolling over of funds. In some countries, the government had to step in to keep the banking
sector solvent.
Policy Response & Challenges: The regulatory response by national authorities and
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has centered on higher capital and liquidity
requirements, improved risk management and greater transparency. The new regulations
have been globally enshrined under Basel III and have been further supplemented by national
regulators in their respective jurisdictions. The primary focus this far, has been on higher
capital requirements (Table 1). On top of the minimum requirements listed in Table 1, national
regulators can impose additional capital requirements. For example, in Switzerland, banks
can be asked to hold up-to an additional 2.5% in risk-weighted capital against their exposures
to the mortgage sector.
Capital is the difference between the assets and liabilities held by a bank. In effect,
creditors and depositors hold the liabilities of a bank while capital is held by the shareholders.
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Table 1. Basel Minimum Risk-Weighted Capital Requirements
Basel II Basel III
Common Equity Tier 1 to RWA N.A. 4.5%
Tier 1 to RWA (includes CET 1) 4% 6%
Total Capital to RWA 8% 8%
Capital Conservation Buffer N.A 2.5%
Any losses that a bank makes are ﬁrst absorbed by shareholders and then by creditors and
depositors. Since shareholders are the owners of the ﬁrm, a higher level of capital encourages
prudent behavior by a bank thus making it less susceptible to ﬁnancial shocks. This in turn
should lower borrowing costs for banks. However, as being the ﬁrst exposed to any losses
requires that the shareholders demand a higher return for taking on this risk. This trade-off
forms the basis for the debate on the beneﬁts and costs of higher capital requirements.
In most of the advanced economies (AE), the response of monetary authorities to the
crisis was to lower the policy interest rate. This policy rate has remained close to zero for almost
seven years now or even turned negative. With inﬂation below target and economic growth
underwhelming, several AE central banks have adopted unprecedented measures loosely
termed as unconventional monetary policies. These policy measures have been undertaken
to lower long term interest rates and ease credit conditions.
The rationale is that low real (adjusted for inﬂation) interest rates would encourage
household spending and thereby positively impact aggregate demand. However, low interest
rates may not lead to higher investment by ﬁrms if future growth expectations are low or there
is uncertainty about future demand. For example, Bertrand and Morse (2013) show that the
increase in consumption leading up to the recent ﬁnancial crisis was driven by less afﬂuent
and younger U.S. households. Further, Mian et al. (2013) show that the fall in demand was
highest in areas that experienced higher appreciation of house prices. Given this nature of
differentiated demand, it is not clear that to what extent the monetary policy measures can
affect aggregate consumption and investment.
Research: This dissertation comprises of three chapters. The ﬁrst two analyze the
impact of capital regulation on bank lending for two different jurisdictions - United States
and Switzerland. The third evaluates the response of U.S. non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms to lower interest
rates.
The ﬁrst chapter is joint work with Prof. Luisa Lambertini. We quantify the impact of
increased capital requirements on the lending spread of U.S. Bank Holding Companies. We use
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syndicated loans, which are loans made by a group of banks to a ﬁrm, as our laboratory of study.
In contrast to most of the literature, we focus on loan pricing and not on volume. Majority
of the literature on this topic utilizes bank level data alone and thus are able to observe only
the equilibrium credit supply and demand. We match borrowing ﬁrm characteristics for each
syndicated loan given out by the Bank Holding Company to its balance sheet characteristics.
This allows us to interpret our results conditional on ﬁrm characteristics and a positive demand
for loans. Further we use stress test failure for BHCs under the Supervisory Capital Assessment
Program and Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review as an individual variation in lending
rates that is independent of demand conditions for the cross-section of banks and a systematic
difference in capital behavior. We ﬁnd: 1) Higher bank capital ratios contribute to higher loan
spreads in the syndicated loan market; 2) Loan pricing is higher for Bank Holding Companies
subjected to stress-tests; 3) Bank Holding Companies that failed the stress tests increased their
loan pricing vis-à-vis peers that passed.
The second chapter is joint work with Prof. Luisa Lambertini, Dr. Dan Wunderli, and
Dr. Robert Bichsel. We investigate the impact of higher capital requirements on loan spreads
offered to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms in Switzerland. Switzerland with a large and heterogeneous
banking sector provides an excellent laboratory for this study. In addition to Swiss regulatory
authorities being at the forefront of capital regulation, different groups of banks have different
capital targets. This allows us to not only assess the cost of each incremental unit of capital
ratio on loan spreads but also how deviation from the supervisory target affects this pricing.
We use a rich new conﬁdential dataset on new credit granted to ﬁrms in Switzerland matched
with supervisory data on bank capital and capital requirements. We use the matched dataset
to analyze the impact of bank capital on credit supply along two different dimensions - pricing
and volume. We also test for a permanent effect of higher capital on new credit growth. We
ﬁnd that banks to increase the loan spread and reduce loan growth in order to attain higher
capital ratios. While statistically signiﬁcant, the effects are economically small. We do not ﬁnd
a statistically signiﬁcant permanent effect of higher capital ratios on new credit growth.
The third chapter empirically investigate changes in ﬁrm behavior along the dimensions
of investment, payout to equity holders and cash holdings in the aftermath of recent ﬁnancial
crisis. I begin the analyses by documenting an increase in the real value of debt on the balance
sheet of U.S. non-ﬁnancial corporates and that this increase has been driven by long-term debt.
I next investigate the relationship between long-term debt and investment and whether this
has changed after the crisis using ﬁxed effects panel regressions. I ﬁnd a negative correlation
between investment as a share of total assets and the ratio of long-term debt to assets. In
the next set of tests, I evaluate alternate uses of debt namely, payouts to equity holders and
3
Introduction
cash holdings. I ﬁnd that after the crisis, a higher long-term debt to asset ratio is positively
correlated with payouts and negatively with the growth in cash holdings. Additionally, the
likelihood of net share repurchases increases with the share of long-term debt post-crisis.
The empirical analysis in this dissertation provides new insights on the linkages be-
tween different economic agents. Assessing how bank capital impacts lending is extremely
policy relevant as national regulators continue working towards a safer banking sector. The
ﬁndings on the post-crisis behavior of ﬁrms contribute to the ongoing debate on the efﬁcacy of
current and future monetary policy actions. The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter
1 presents the ﬁrst paper, Is Bank Capital Regulation Costly for Firms? – Evidence from Syndi-
cated Loans. Chapter 2 presents Bank Capital and Firm Lending: The Case for Switzerland.
Chapter 3 presents Leverage & Use of Financing: Corporate America after the Great Recession.
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1 Is Bank Capital Regulation Costly for
Firms? – Evidence from Syndicated
Loans
Joint work with Prof. Luisa Lambertini (EPFL)
1.1 Introduction
The 2008 ﬁnancial crisis has brought to the forefront the linkage between the capital position
of the banking sector and the real economy. The primary role of banks is to intermediate
funds between borrowers and savers. During an economic downturn, this channel of credit
intermediation might be adversely affected by weaker credit demand, by concerns about the
credit-worthiness of borrowers, or by lower credit supply due to an insufﬁcient amount of
capital and liquidity in the banking sector. Much of the post-crisis policy debate has focused
on the credit supply channel. National regulatory authorities and the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision have responded to the ﬁnancial crisis by requiring ﬁnancial institutions
to improve risk management, increase transparency, and hold additional capital and liquidity.
These regulations have been enshrined under Basel III. Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act was
signed into U.S. federal law in July, 2010.
This paper aims to investigate the impact of increased capital requirements on the
lending spread of U.S. Bank Holding Companies (BHCs). We use syndicated loans, which are
loans made by a group of banks to a ﬁrm, as our laboratory of study. Syndicated loans have
increasingly become an important source of ﬁnance for ﬁrms. The Shared National Credit
program, which tracks syndicated credit of more than $20 million and shared by three or more
federally supervised institutions, reported a total outstanding credit of $1.34 trillion for U.S.
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banks including credits to ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) use the H.8 statistics
to estimate that syndicate loans are 26 percent of total Commercial and Industrial loans in the
United States.
In contrast to most of the literature, we focus on loan pricing and not on volume.
The main identiﬁcation challenge arises from the endogeneity between credit demand and
credit supply. For example, the new regulatory environment coincides with the post ﬁnancial
crisis period when credit demand was low and credit supply tight due to bank balance sheet
constraints and low credit worthiness of borrowers. The majority of the literature on this topic
utilizes bank level data alone and thus are able to observe only the equilibrium credit supply
and demand. We match borrowing ﬁrm characteristics for each syndicated loan given out by
the BHC to its balance sheet characteristics. This allows us to interpret our results conditional
on ﬁrm characteristics and a positive demand for loans. Additionally, we use macroeconomic
variables to control for demand conditions.
We start by documenting the evolution of syndicated loan volume and pricing. We
present evidence that there was a sharp drop in syndicated loan volume and a corresponding
increase in pricing in the aftermath of the crisis. While volume has recovered to pre-crisis
levels, loan pricing has remained persistently high. Next, using our matched ﬁrm-bank dataset,
we show that higher regulated capital ratios contribute to an increase in loan pricing. We ﬁnd
a 1 percentage point increase in the regulated capital ratio to impact loan pricing by 5 to 7
basis points depending on the measure of the capital used. The results are robust to ﬁrm and
bank ﬁxed effects.
To further address endogeneity issues, we use stress test failure for BHCs under the
Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) and Comprehensive Capital Analysis and
Review (CCAR) as an individual variation in lending rates that is independent of demand
conditions for the cross-section of banks and a systematic difference in capital behavior. In
fact, ﬁnancial institutions that failed the stress tests were asked to raise additional capital in
the short run or to resubmit their capital plans. To the best of our our knowledge, this is the
ﬁrst paper that exploits this variation. Using the difference-in-difference (DID) framework, we
show that BHCs that failed the stress tests charged higher loan prices relative to BHCs that did
not fail theirs.
Our analysis provides evidence on the economic cost of higher bank capital. From a
policy standpoint this must be weighed against the beneﬁts of making the banking sector
safer. Higher capital reduces the probability of bank default and associated losses in economic
output or the likelihood of a taxpayer funded bailout.
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The remainder of the paper is structured is as follows. In Section 1.2, we brieﬂy discuss
the literature. Section 1.3 provides a short review of bank capital regulation in the United
States. Section 1.4 describes the data and presents the summary statistics. Section 1.5 presents
the econometric model and discusses the results. Section 1.6 presents robustness checks.
Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Literature
The aftermath of the recent ﬁnancial crisis has witnessed a wave of regulatory changes towards
strengthening capital requirements. Thereby, an active debate on the costs and beneﬁts of
higher capital has ensued.
The Modigliani-Miller (MM, 1958) theorem is the basis of the debate on higher capital
requirements. Per the MM hypothesis, the capital structure is irrelevant in a frictionless envi-
ronment. This would imply that the intermediation capacity of a bank will not be constrained
by equity. However, there are conditions under which the MM hypothesis breaks down and an
increase in equity is perhaps costly.Aiyar et al. (2014) list the conditions under which equity
ﬁnance is costly and provide empirical evidence on the negative impact of higher capital
requirements on bank lending. These cases include favorable tax treatment of debt, deposit
insurance, and adverse selection costs of raising external equity.
The impact of capital requirements on bank lending has been an area of active research.
Pre-Basel I implementation studies include those by Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Hancock
and A. (1993). Bernanke and Lown analyze the impact of bank capital on lending during the
1990-1991 recession in the United States and ﬁnd that a 1 percentage point increase in the
capital to asset ratio contributed to a 2.6 percentage point increase in loan growth. Hancock
and Wilcox analyze bank credit ﬂows in 1990 using data on U.S. commercial banks with assets
greater than 300 million dollars. They test the hypothesis that banks have an internal target
ratio and credit growth depends on the divergence from this target. They ﬁnd a reduction
of about 1.4 dollars in bank credit for every dollar of capital target shortfall. Post 2008, a
number of studies across different jurisdictions have estimated the impact of bank capital
requirements on lending to ﬁrms.Francis and Osborne (2009) use the Hancock and Wilcox
approach for U.K. banks during the period 1996-2007. They ﬁnd stronger credit growth for
banks which had surplus capital relative to target. They ﬁnd that a 1 percentage point increase
in capital requirements results in a 0.65 percentage point rise in the target capital ratio. The
adjustment to the desired target takes four years and results in a 1.16 percentage point decrease
in loan volume. Also for the United Kingdom, Bridges et al. (2014)study the impact of capital
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requirements on individual banks between 1990 and 2011. They ﬁnd a 1 percentage point
increase in capital requirements reduces loan growth to private non-ﬁnancial corporations
by 3.9 percentage points in the following year. Berrospide and Edge (2010) use data on U.S.
Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) between 1992Q1 to 2009Q3 to analyze the impact of bank
capital on lending. They ﬁnd an increase of 0.7 - 1.2 percentage point in loan growth for a
1 percentage point increase in the capital ratio. Labonne and Lamé (2014) utilize data from
French banks between 2003 and 2011 to study the sensitivity of capital ratios and supervisory
capital requirements on lending to non-ﬁnancial corporations. They ﬁnd that an increase of 1
percentage point in the Tier 1 capital to asset ratio corresponds to a 1 percentage increase in
credit growth. Despite the richness of results provided by these studies, it is difﬁcult to identify
a causal relationship between capital and lending based on bank level regressions alone.
A number of contributors have focused on disentangling credit supply factors from
credit demand.Carlson et al. (2013) attempt to disentangle demand from supply by matching
banks to a set of neighboring banks in the United States of similar size and holding a similar
portfolio of assets and liabilities. They ﬁnd a positive but small impact of higher capital ratios
on loan growth between 2001 and 2011. They ﬁnd that a 1 percentage point increase in the
capital ratio corresponds to only 0.05-0.2 percentage point increase in loan growth. Their
coefﬁcient on the capital ratio is positive for the entire period but signiﬁcant only during the
period between 2008 and 2010. Becker and Ivashina (2014) use the choice of debt ﬁnancing
by non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms as an identiﬁcation strategy for credit demand. Using data on U.S.
banks and ﬁrms between 1990 and 2010, they ﬁnd a one standard deviation tightening of
lending standards reduces the probability to receive a loan for a ﬁrm by 1.4 percentage points
conditional on the ﬁrm’s ability to raise external debt.Jimenez et al. (2012) match Commercial
and Industrial loan applications with loans granted in Spain between 2002Q2 and 2008Q4 to
analyze the impact of monetary and economic conditions on loan supply conditional on bank
capital and liquidity. They ﬁnd a negative impact on loan acceptance for weakly capitalized
banks in response to 100 basis point increase in the policy interest rate.
The closest methodology to this project is the paper by Santos and Winton (2013). They
construct a matched U.S. ﬁrm and bank dataset between 1987 and 2007 to test several theories
of bank capital and lending. They ﬁnd a small negative impact of bank capital on loan rates
with a larger effect for borrowers who do not have access to the corporate bond markets. We
depart from their analysis in three ways. First, we use regulatory capital ratios as deﬁned by
Basel regulations as opposed to a shareholder equity to asset ratio. Second, we use BHC data
instead of Call Report data for bank characteristics. This is an important distinction as BHCs
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have higher capital requirements.1 Third, our sample spans the post ﬁnancial crisis regulatory
environment.
In addition, a growing literature has used the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) as an
identiﬁcation strategy to study bank behavior. Using Call report data on U.S. banks,Berger and
Roman (2013) ﬁnd that TARP recipient banks increased market shares and market power.Black
and Hazelwood (2013) analyze data from the Survey of terms of bank lending from 2007 to
2010 and ﬁnd that larger TARP recipient banks originated riskier loans. We use the SCAP and
CCAR for further identiﬁcation and not TARP.
1.3 U.S. Bank Capital Regulation
1.3.1 U.S. Bank Capital Regulation
In this section, we highlight the heightened regulatory oversight and capital requirements for
U.S. BHCs. We begin by deﬁning the capital measures under the Basel framework,
1. Tier 1 Capital (core capital) predominantly consists of voting eligible common stock,
disclosed reserves, and after- tax retained earnings;
2. Tier 2 Capital (supplementary capital) is limited to 100% of Tier 1 and includes undis-
closed reserves, revaluation reserves, general provisions and general loan-loss reserves,
hybrid debt capital instruments, and subordinated term debt;
3. Leverage ratio is the ratio of Tier 1 capital or total regulatory capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2)
to total exposures. The total exposure measure includes on-balance sheet exposures,
derivative exposures, securities ﬁnancing transaction exposures, and off-balance sheet
items.
4. Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) are computed by weighting different asset classes and/or
off-balance sheet exposures by a corresponding risk weight. For example, under Basel II,
sovereign with a risk weighting AA- or higher had a 0% risk weight while similarly rated
corporates were risk-weighted of 20%
Basel I, implemented in 1992, required banks to hold a core capital ratio (Tier 1 Capital-
to-RWA) of at least 4%, and a total capital ratio ((Tier 1 + Tier 2) Capital-to-RWA) of at least
1We will document key aspects covering capital regulations under the Basel guidelines in section 2.3.
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8%. The supplementary capital was also limited to 100% of core capital. The second Basel
accord, Basel II, was initially introduced in 2004 and should have become effective in 2008
for the largest BHCs.2 Basel II redesigned the weighting scheme of RWA assets by allowing for
more risk differentiation. In the United States a minimum 3% leverage ratio was also to be
implemented. Due to the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis, Basel II implementation was delayed or
waived. BHCs with assets greater than $ 250 billion could use the internal ratings to calculate
RWAs under the Basel guidelines3. This could have allowed large BHCs to have lower RWAs.
However under U.S. regulation, the RWAs calculated under the IRB could not be below 85
% of those calculated using the standardized approach. In the aftermath of the ﬁnancial
crisis, regulatory authorities moved ahead with additional capital requirements with a longer
phasing-in horizon. With Basel III banks have to hold a core capital ratio of at least 6%, and
the common equity should be at least 4.5% of RWA. Total capital ratio is left unchanged and it
still has to be at least 8%. Basel III introduced two new buffers:
1. Capital conservation buffer, which requires banks to hold an additional 2.5% of RWAs
during calm times that they can draw down when losses are incurred. This is a manda-
tory requirement.
2. Countercyclical buffer, which requires banks to hold an additional 2.5% of RWAs if credit
growth is resulting in an unacceptable build up of systematic risk as determined by
national authorities.
Additionally, in response to the ﬁnancial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted, the imple-
mentation of which began in August 2010. It contains certain provisions that contribute to
enhanced capital requirements. For example, phasing out of trust-preferred securities from
Tier 1 capital. Dodd-Frank also requires U.S. banks to hold a counter-cyclical buffer. When
fully implemented, advanced approaches BHCs would be required to meet a risk-based capital
ratio of 13 percent. The implementation deadline for tier 1 and total risk-based capital ratios is
2016. The conservation buffer and the optional countercyclical buffer needs to be phased-in
by 2019. In table 1.1, we document the increase in capital requirements for U.S. BHCs between
the Basel I and II regimes and the current regulations.
2With at least $250 billion in consolidated assets or at least $10 billion on balance sheet foreign asset holdings.
3Internal Ratings Based Approach under the Basel regulation terminology.
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Table 1.1. U.S. Capital Regulation
(Before 2009) (After 2009)
Minimum Upper Bound
Common Equity Tier 1 to RWA N.A. 7%* 9.5%**
Tier 1 to RWA (includes CET 1) 4% 8.5%* 10.5%**
(Tier 1 + Tier 2) to RWA 8% 10.5%* 13.0%**
Tier 1 to Assets 3% 4% 7%***
* including capital conservation buffer ** including countercyclical buffer
***Taking into account the supplementary leverage ratio
1.3.2 SCAP & CCAR
The SCAP program was initiated and carried out by the federal bank regulatory agencies
between February and April of 2009. All domestic banking institutions with assets greater than
$100 billion at year-end 2008 were required to participate. 19 institutions met this threshold
guideline and these institutions collectively held two-thirds of the banking sector assets and
more than half the loans.4 SCAP was designed to estimate losses and capital requirements
for 2009 and 2010 under adverse economic scenarios. Of the nineteen institutions, ten were
found to have combined shortfall of $74.6 billion in capital. Table 1.2 lists the required amount
of capital to be raised. Building on the SCAP, in late 2010, the Federal Reserve initiated annual
stress-testing (CCAR). The threshold for being subjected to the stress-test was lowered to $50
billion in consolidated assets. The key requirement under CCAR is for BHCs to submit a 24
month forward looking capital plan. The Federal Reserve has the right to qualitatively or
quantitatively reject these plans. However, SCAP was the only instance where institutions were
explicitly required to raise capital.
1.4 Data and Summary Statistics
We use multiple data sources for this analysis. The data on syndicated loans comes from
Thompson Reuters SDC Platinum database. Quarterly BHC data is obtained from the FRY-9C
ﬁlings. Firm level data is obtained using Compustat. Both these datasets are accessed via the
Wharton Research Database Services (WRDS). The details on data series used is listed in Table
1.16 in Appendix 3.A. We use the leading index for the United States as our macroeconomic
variable. The leading index is a composite index that includes non-farm payroll employment,
the unemployment rate, average hours worked and wages in manufacturing, housing permits
4www.sigtarp.gov
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Table 1.2. Capital required under SCAP
Institution Required Capital ($ billion)
Bank of America 33.9
Wells Fargo 13.7
GMAC 11.5
CitiGroup 5.5
Regions 2.5
SunTrust 2.2
KeyCorp 1.8
Morgan Stanley 1.8
Fifth Third 1.1
PNC 0.6
American Express 0.0
BB&T 0.0
BNY Mellon 0.0
Capital One 0.0
Goldman Sachs 0.0
J.P. Morgan 0.0
State Street 0.0
U.S. Bancorp 0.0
MetLife 0.0
Source: www.sigtarp.gov
(1-4 units), initial unemployment insurance claims, delivery times from the Institute for supply
management manufacturing survey, and the interest rate spread between the 10-year Treasury
bond and the 3-month Treasury bill. The data on stress test results is obtained from the website
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
We begin our sample in 1996Q1 because this is the ﬁrst time period for which BHCs
report Tier 1 capital and RWAs. The syndicated loan sample encompasses the period between
1996Q1 and 2015Q4 for U.S. non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms (excluding all U.S. borrowers with SIC codes
between 6000-6999). The SDC platinum dataset provides loan information by total amount
and tranche amount. We use loan tranche as the unit of analysis as different tranches of the
same loan package might have different pricing and may or may not include covenants. The
All in Drawn Spread (AID Spread) is the number of basis points over LIBOR including fees
that a ﬁrm was charged for the loan tranche. To obtain borrower characteristics, we merge
the ﬁrms that participated the syndicated loan market with corresponding ﬁrm level data
from Compustat using the DealScan-Compustat link ﬁle on WRDS by Chava and Roberts
(2008) and CUSIP. Loan tranche observations for which no pricing information is available are
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dropped from the sample. Finally, we manually match the lead bank in the lending facility to
its corresponding BHC before merging with BHC data from WRDS. Lead bank identiﬁcation
follows Ivashina (2005). Observations with missing total bank assets are removed.
The ﬁnal sample consists of 2825 ﬁrms matched to 45 BHCs. There are a total of 11215
unique loans with 15794 loan tranches. The mean number of tranches per syndicated loan is
1.8, 49.87 percent are loans with a single tranche and the maximum number of tranches is 18.
Table 1.3 presents loan and borrower characteristics for the ﬁnal sample. The mean tranche
over the entire sample has an AID spread of 167 basis points. The cut-offs for the bottom
and top 5 percentile of loan price are 30 and 375 basis points, respectively. The mean ﬁrm
in the sample has return on assets equal to 0.64 percentage points, cash to asset ratio of 7.2
percentage points, and a long-term debt to asset ratio of 27.93 percentage points. In Figure
1.1, we present the distribution of ﬁrm size in our sample. The average tranche maturity is
4 years. The variation between the 5th and 95th percentiles of ﬁrm and loan characteristics
indicate a reasonable degree of sample heterogeneity.
Table 1.3. Summary statistics for loan and ﬁrm characteristics
Variable N Mean SD p5 p95
AID Spread 15794 167 115.84 30 375
Firm Assets (log) 15794 7.42 1.56 4.97 10.10
Firm Cash to Assets 15794 0.07 0.09 .001 0.27
Firm Return on Assets 15794 .006 0.04 -0.036 0.039
Firm Debt to Assets 15794 0.34 0.21 0.028 0.70
Loan Tranche Size (log) 15794 5.33 1.34 2.99 7.44
Maturity (years) 15794 3.09 9.93 0.997 6.95
We begin our preliminary analysis by presenting the evolution of syndicated loan volume
and the AID spread weighted by the tranche amount for the entire sample in Figure 1.1. We
observe that the total volume of syndicated loans collapsed during the crisis but has since
recovered to pre-crisis levels. The weighted average AID spread spiked during the ﬁnancial
crisis and has not returned to its pre-2008 level, the difference being approximately 100 basis
points.
To better understand this increase in post-crisis spread, we explore underlying ﬁrm
and loan characteristics that could potentially be a driving force. These could include ﬁrms
switching to bond ﬁnancing due to low interest rates, a shift towards riskier ﬁrms after the
crisis, and a fundamental change in tranche size and maturity.
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Figure 1.1. Firm Size Distribution
Figure 1.2. Quarterly evolution of syndicated loans and size-weighted AID spread
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We begin by comparing the AID spread of our syndicated loan sample with Bank of
AmericaMerrill Lynch’sU.S. Corporate Option-Adjusted Spreads (OAS) for investment andnon-
investment grade ﬁrms pre- and post-crisis.5. If borrowing costs were signiﬁcantly different
in the syndicated loan and corporate bond markets, ﬁrms would have a strong incentive to
switch between these ﬁnancing options.The results presented in Table 1.4 show that there has
been a post-crisis increase in spread both in the syndicated loan and corporate bond markets.
As we do not observe the same ﬁrms in the corporate bond option-adjusted spread data as in
our sample and that the OAS spread is weighted by ﬁrm market capitalization, we refrain from
discussing the observed differences in magnitude. The key takeaway is that there has been an
increase in the cost of debt ﬁnancing for ﬁrms post crisis. The difference in the mean spread
pre and post crisis is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level for both of them.
Table 1.4. Comparison of AID and Corporate Bond Spreads
Up-to 2007Q4 2008Q1 to 2015Q4
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
AID Spread (Investment) 65.74 56.22 134.68 69.96
AID Spread (Non-investment) 190.19 103.91 271.29 133.77
Corporate Investment Grade Spread 121 44.57 215 118.28
Corporate Below Investment Grade Spread 508 215.39 679 335.23
The corporate bond spread sample starts in 1996Q4
Next, we present evidence for our sample ﬁrms’ access to corporate bond markets.
Figure 1.3 plots the fraction of ﬁrms every quarter in the ﬁnal matched sample that have issued
a bond at least once over the last ﬁve years. Overall, 48.67 percent of our ﬁrms have tapped
the bond market over this time-span. Therefore ﬁrms in our sample are not reliant on bank
funding alone.
Next, we plot the evolution of the weighted average credit rating and the AID spread for
our sample ﬁrms in Figure 1.4. A higher value of credit rating indicates lower ﬁrm quality. We
observe the quality of ﬁrms in the sample to have fallen during the crisis and improved since.
We ﬁnd an increase in the weighted average AID spread of approximately 75 basis points. This
is also the case for unrated ﬁrms as seen in Figure 1.5. We ﬁnd a 4 percentage point increase in
the total number of non-investment and unrated grade tranches after 2007Q4 as compared to
before 2007Q4.
We provided evidence on higher spreads for both investment and non-investment grade
ﬁrms in Table 1.4. We take this analysis to a more granular level to convince ourselves that the
observed increase in spread is not driven by a certain category of ﬁrms. We split our ﬁrms into
5These are available at https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/32297
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Figure 1.3. Fraction of bond issuing in-sample ﬁrms (Past 5 years)
Figure 1.4. Weighted average credit rating and AID spread
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Figure 1.5. Weighted average AID spread - Unrated ﬁrms
4 groups by Standard & Poor’s (S&P) long-term credit ratings. Group 1 comprises of all ﬁrms
rated A- and above; group 2 of ﬁrms with ratings below A- and down to BBB-; group 3 has
ratings below BBB- and group 4 contains all ﬁrms that did not have a long term credit rating
on Compustat. We summarize the pre- and post-crisis AID spread for these groups in Table 1.5.
We ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant difference in the mean spread pre- and post-crisis. We next
analyze the loan characteristics as outlined in Table 1.6. The average tranche amount starting
2008 is USD 595.66 million, which is higher than the period prior. We also observe a slight
increase in the mean maturity. Combining this with the evolution of ﬁrm quality presented
earlier, we do not ﬁnd any indications of a ﬂight to quality in the syndicated loan market post
crisis.
Table 1.5. Comparison of AID Spreads by rating category
Up to 2007Q4 2008Q1 to 2015Q4
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
≥ A- 39.16 39.12 95.49 60.32
≥ BBB- & <A- 83.55 58.84 151.07 67.17
<BBB- 190.22 104.46 271.85 134.75
No Rating 145.67 90.75 221.46 119.16
Next we analyze the evolution of our capital measures for the BHCs in our sample. All
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Table 1.6. Tranche Amount and Maturity
Up to 2007Q4 2008Q1 to 2015Q4
N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D.
Tranche Amount (USD Million) 10,791 378.63 773.03 5792 609.26 1186.84
Maturity (Years) 10,079 3.95 1.92 5610 4.34 1.34
BHCs ﬁle Consolidated Financial Statements using the FR Y-9C. We consider three measures
of the regulated capital ratio: Tier 1 capital to RWAs; total RBC to RWAs; Tier 1 capital to
Assets. We observe a sharp increase in these ratios between the end of 2007 and the end of the
sample as seen in Figure 1.6. The spike in the capital measures between 2008Q3 and 2008Q4
corresponds to the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) carried out by the U.S. Treasury at the
height of the ﬁnancial crisis in October 2008. As per this program, banks could sell preferred
stocks between 1 and 3 percent of RWA and not more than USD 25 billion to the U.S. Treasury.
At the same time, the Treasury received warrants to purchase common stock. The capital
injection counted towards Tier 1 capital. However, the terms of the program included: a)
cumulative dividends of 5 percent until ﬁve years of the investment and 9 percent after that; b)
restrictions on dividends and on executive compensation. Banks had a strong incentive to
build up their capital ratios and repay the equity injections. We present evidence on common
stock issuance by the BHCs in our sample between 1996Q1 and 2013Q4 in Figure 1.7. We
observe a sharp increase in stock issuance starting 2008Q4.
Another channel via which BHCs can adjust to higher risk based capital requirements
is the denominator, i.e. RWAs. We observe the ratio of risk weighted assets to total assets
to behave pro-cyclically for our sample BHCs as shown in Figure 1.8. During the sample
period, it reached a peak of 84.7 percent in 2007Q2 and a trough of 66.3 percent in 2011Q2.
We take this as evidence of re-balancing the asset portfolio toward safer assets. Hence, BHCs
have responded to the higher capital requirements by adjusting both the numerator and
denominator of the regulated capital ratios.
To summarize, we have provided aggregate evidence on higher syndicated loan pricing,
common stock issuance, and an active management of BHC assets in the aftermath of the
crisis. In the following section, we empirically evaluate the link between regulatory capital
ratios and loan pricing.
18
1.4 Data and Summary Statistics
Figure 1.6. BHC capital ratios, 1996Q1 - 2013Q4
Figure 1.7. BHC Common Stock Issuance, 1996Q1 - 2013Q4
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Figure 1.8. BHC RWA to Asset ratio, 1996Q1 - 2013Q4
1.5 Econometric Model and Results
1.5.1 Estimating the impact of regulatory capital ratios on loan pricing
To determine the impact of regulated bank capital ratios on syndicated loan pricing, we
estimate the following equation,
AIDspreadi , j ,t = β1CAi ,t−1+β2Firmi , j ,t−1+β3Banki ,t−1+β5Loani , j ,t +
β4Macrot−1+ f j +bi +σi j t (1.1)
AIDspread is the loan price that ﬁrm, j , is charged for the loan tranche by BHC, i . CA
is the regulatory capital ratio at time t −1. We use three different measures of the regulatory
capital ratio: RBC to RWA; Tier 1 to RWA; and Tier 1 to assets. Firm and lead bank characteris-
tics, all measured at time t −1 are included in the control variables. For BHC characteristics,
we use measures of size, liquidity, proﬁtability, loan portfolio losses, and funding costs.6 Size
6Our choice of BHC variables reﬂect the balance sheet variables used by the Fed in stress-testing.
20
1.5 Econometric Model and Results
is deﬁned as the logarithm of total BHC assets. Liquidity is deﬁned as the ratio of cash and
balances due from depository institutions and federal funds sold and securities purchased
under agreements to resell to total BHC assets. PPNR is the ratio of net interest and net non-
interest income to total BHC assets. Provisions is deﬁned as the allowance of loan and lease
losses scaled by total BHC assets. As a measure of Charge-Offs, we use the ratio of charge-offs
on Commercial and Industrial loans to total BHC assets. As measures of funding costs, we
use deposit expense (ratio of the sum of interest on time and other deposits to total liabilities)
and funding expense (interest paid on trading liabilities, other borrowed money, subordinated
notes and debentures scaled by total liabilities).
To control for ﬁrm characteristics, we use measures of size, liquidity, proﬁtability, lever-
age, and credit rating. Size is the logarithm of total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of cash and
short term investments to assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to assets. Leverage is the ratio
of total debt to assets. We also control for the ﬁrm’s credit risk using the Standard and Poor’s
domestic long-term issuer credit rating. Unrated ﬁrms are categorized separately.
Loan speciﬁc variables are measured at time t . We control for the size, maturity, and
presence of covenants in every observation. Loan Size is the logarithm of the tranche amount.
Loan Maturity is the logarithm of maturity of the loan tranche . Covenant Indicator is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if there were covenants attached to the loan and 0 otherwise. We
also control for the size of the syndicate and include dummies for each loan type. Tables 1.18
in Appendix 3.A lists the loan types. The ﬁnal sample includes 27 types of loans. f j denotes
ﬁrm ﬁxed effects; bi , bank ﬁxed effects; and σi j t is the error term. We use the leading index as
control for macroeconomic conditions.7 We also estimate the above equation using a set of
macroeconomic variables, measured at t −1, that includes annual GDP growth, inﬂation, and
an indicator of ﬁnancial stress from the Cleveland Fed (CFSI). The CFSI is a composite index
that takes into account stress in credit, equity, foreign-exchange, interbank, real estate, and
securitization markets. Our results go through with the alternative macro-economic variables.
If higher bank capital results in higher loan pricing, we would expect to ﬁnd β1 in
equation 1.1 to be signiﬁcantly greater than zero. Table 2.7 reports the estimation results for
our three different measures of the regulatory capital ratio. The estimates for a 1 percentage
point increase in the regulatory capital ratio range from 5.1 to 7.37 basis points. The largest
7The leading index for each state predicts the six-month growth rate of the state’s coincident index. In addition
to the coincident index, the models include other variables that lead the economy: state-level housing permits (1
to 4 units), state initial unemployment insurance claims, delivery times from the Institute for Supply Management
(ISM) manufacturing survey, and the interest rate spread between the 10-year Treasury bond and the 3-month
Treasury bill.
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impact is observed for the Tier 1 leverage ratio. As outlined in section 2.3, for the BHCs in our
sample, the minimum increase in total risk based capital requirements is 2.5 percent from
8 percent to 10.5 percent including the capital conservation buffer. Our results, assuming a
linear cost of capital, indicate that this would lead to a 12.76 basis point increase in the AID
spread. This represents a 7.6 percent increase relative to the sample average. The increase
in Tier 1 capital ratio from a minimum 4 percent to 8.5 percent would lead to AID spreads
increasing by 22.97 basis points. Finally, every percentage point increase in the Tier 1 leverage
ratio would cause a 20.29 basis point increase in the AID spread. The increase in loan spread
could be higher if the additional requirements for countercyclical buffer and the too big to fail
regulation are factored in.
Next we discuss the control variables reported in Table 2.7. Of the BHC variables, provi-
sions and charge-offs come out as the strongest determinants of loan spreads quantitatively.
This indicates that BHCs that have to write-down larger fractions of their loan portfolio or are
expecting greater future losses demand a higher price for new loans. Larger BHCs charge a
slightly higher spread. This result points towards a certain degree of monopolistic competition.
Also interesting is the positive coefﬁcient on the share of liquid assets on the BHC balance
sheet. It indicates the opportunity cost of holding cash and cash-like instruments. While,
one could expect a BHC with a higher share of revenue to assets to charge a lower spread,
our coefﬁcient on PPNR is positive. We interpret the positive coefﬁcient to be reﬂective of
the BHCs size, business model and macroeconomic expectations. PPNR is a measure of net
interest margin and net non-interest income for BHCs. Banks incorporate their expectations
of future losses in the interest rate charged on new loans and this raises the net interest margin
in the short-run while losses appear after a few years(Borio et al. (2015)). Also, while a steeper
yield curve should positively impact net interest income, it could lead to lower non-interest
income. Finally larger BHCs have a larger share of non-interest income. We ﬁnd a higher share
of funding expenses to liabilities to be negatively correlated with the spread. This is because
the gross interest paid on deposits and other sources of funding are positively correlated with
macroeconomic conditions. Among ﬁrm controls, we ﬁnd size, proﬁtability and leverage to be
statistically signiﬁcant. Larger ﬁrms command lower spreads. A ﬁrm with higher leverage is
riskier and is charged a higher spread. On the other hand, more proﬁtable ﬁrms are offered
a lower spread. For our loan characteristics, loan size and presence of covenants are signiﬁ-
cant. Loan covenants in principle increases lender protection and thus lead to a lower spread.
Loan size is inversely related to the AID spread as consistent with earlier literature.Strahan
(1999) ﬁnds evidence that banks use loan size and maturity in a complementary way to price
of a loan, after adjusting for publicly available measures of borrower risk. Our measure of
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macroeconomic conditions is negatively correlated with loan spreads indicating a higher cost
of borrowing during a downturn and vice-versa.
1.5.2 Regulatory pressure and loan pricing
In this section, we exploit stress testing by the Federal Reserve and subsequent failure as a
shock to short-run BHC capital requirements and analyze the impact on the AID spread. We
use a DID framework to ascertain any differences in the AID spread charged in the syndicated
loan market by affected BHCs. We primarily focus on the SCAP as it explicitly imposed capital
issuance on failing BHCs. As outlined in section 1.3.2, 10 out of the 19 institutions subjected to
SCAP were required to raise capital. We do extend our analysis to the subsequent stress-tests,
namely CCAR. We use the following regression set-up to estimate the effects of being subjected
to a stress test and failing it:
AIDspreadi , j ,t = δ1SC APi ,t +δ2SC AP FAILi ,t ∗Fai li ,t +β2Firmi , j ,t−1
+β3Banki ,t−1+β5Loani , j ,t +β4Macrot−1+ f j +σi j t (1.2)
The ﬁrm, bank, loan and macroeconomic control variables are the same as in equation
1.1. SCAP is a dummy that is equal to 1 starting 2009Q2.8 Sample BHCs that were stress-tested
under SCAP have been subject to future stress-tests as well. The coefﬁcient δ1, therefore,
captures the impact of being subjected to stress-testing on the AID spread. A positive and
signiﬁcant coefﬁcient would that a stress-tested BHC charges a higher spread vis-a-vis it’s
peers.9 SCAP FAIL is a dummy that is equal to 1 only for a BHC that failed the stress test for the
period 2009Q2-2010Q4. The coefﬁcient δ2 captures the effect of failing the SCAP given that a
BHC was subjected to it. As before, we use ﬁrm ﬁxed effects to control for time-invariant ﬁrm
characteristics.
We report the results in Table 1.8. Our main variables of interest are the coefﬁcients on
SCAP and SCAP FAIL. We ﬁnd both δ1 and δ2 to be greater than zero and statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1 percent level. The coefﬁcient implies a higher spread of 31.52 to 41.03 basis points
8SCAP was announced in February 2009 and the ﬁrst details were released in April.
9Our results are qualitatively similar if we restrict the dummy to be one between 2009Q2-2010Q4, the period
prior to the next stress-test.
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after the commencement of stress testing. Also, BHCs that failed the assessment charged
46.30 to 47.22 basis points higher compared to other BHCs between 2009Q2 and 2010Q4.
Next we turn to our controls; our measures of capital as a function of risk-weighted assets are
statistically signiﬁcant but the tier 1 leverage ratio. This is primarily driven by the low between
BHC variation in the Tier 1 to asset ratio at any given point in time. Other BHC, ﬁrm, loan and
macroeconomics controls are qualitatively similar to the ones reported in Table 2.7. Combined
with results reported in Table 2.7, we provide evidence that increased capital regulation and
greater regulatory oversight have contributed to higher loan pricing in the syndicated loan
market.
Next, we extend our analysis to incorporate the CCAR. We substitute the dummies SCAP
and SCAP FAIL with Regulatory Pressure and Regulatory Pressure Fail respectively. Regulatory
Pressure is a dummy variable equal to 1 as soon as a BHC started getting stress-tested till the
end of our sample in 2015Q4. For example, in 2015, 31 BHCs were subjected to stress-tests. We
list BHCs subjected to SCAP and CCAR in Table 1.17 of Appendix 3.A. Regulatory Pressure Fail
is now a dummy variable equal to 1 for a BHC failing the stress-test for the duration till the
next stress-testing exercise is conducted. For example, if a BHC was required to raise capital
under SCAP 2009 but its capital plans were accepted under CCAR 2012, the dummy would be
one for the period 2009Q2 to 2010Q4. The results for SCAP 2011 were not made public by the
Federal Reserve and therefore we do not have any BHCs failing the test for 2011. We present
the estimation results in Table 1.9. The coefﬁcients on our DID terms are again positive and
statistically signiﬁcant. While the impact of being subjected to a stress-test is quantitative
similar to only being subjected to SCAP, the effect of failure once we include CCAR results is
much smaller. We attribute this difference to the fact that SCAP failure explicitly imposed
capital raising requirements as opposed to failure under CCAR.
Finally, we try to rule out alternate explanations for a higher spread. To allay concerns
that a change in ﬁrm characteristics as a driver of spreads, we have included a number of ﬁrm
controls. Additionally, we exposited in section 2.4, no changes in the riskiness of ﬁrms in the
sample as determined by credit ratings. Similarly, we include a a number of controls for BHC
characteristics. As further evidence for our BHC controls being able to capture any balance
sheet heterogeneity, we estimate equation 1.3 using a population averaged probit model.
Fai li ,t = β0+β1Banki ,t−1+β4Macrot−1+σi ,t (1.3)
Fail is a binary variable that takes a value equal to 1 for a BHC failing SCAP or CCAR in the
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quarter where the stress-test results are announced. The vector Bank comprises the lagged
four quarter means of the same set of BHC control variables speciﬁed in equation 1.1. Macro is
also the lagged four quarter mean of the leading index. Figure 1.9 plots the median predicted
failure probability for the average bank after our estimation. Our BHC variables are good
predictors of SCAP failure and thus absorbing BHC balance sheet effects that could inﬂuence
the AID spread. Predicted probabilities before the ﬁnancial crisis are less than 10 percent.
Predicted failure probabilities under CCAR are lower since the maximum number of failures
occurred happened under SCAP and the fact that we are estimating failure probability for the
average BHC. We report the marginal effect for each co-variate in appendix 1.19.
Figure 1.9. Predicted probability of stress-test failure
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Table 1.7. Impact of Regulatory Capital Ratio on All In Drawn Spread
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Group AID Spread AID Spread AID Spread
RBC to RWA BHC 5.102***
(5.51)
Tier1 to RWA BHC 5.104***
(5.21)
Tier1 to Assets BHC 7.369***
(5.14)
Size BHC 0.242*** 0.246*** 0.264***
(6.49) (6.60) (7.63)
Liquidity BHC 0.711*** 0.558** 1.081***
(2.98) (2.26) (4.47)
PPNR BHC 11.29*** 10.14*** 8.896***
(4.12) (3.65) (3.27)
Provisions BHC 48.56*** 52.56*** 54.89***
(7.90) (8.96) (9.41)
Loan Losses BHC 75.46*** 75.93*** 72.94***
(3.61) (3.64) (3.56)
Deposit Expense BHC -18.65*** -16.13** -16.02**
(-2.84) (-2.42) (-2.33)
Funding Expense BHC -23.56*** -23.30*** -21.66***
(-5.19) (-5.23) (-4.63)
Size Firm -0.0916*** -0.0975*** -0.0945***
(-4.41) (-4.73) (-4.90)
ROA Firm -1.908*** -1.908*** -1.911***
(-4.65) (-4.63) (-4.68)
Liquidity Firm 0.0820 0.0772 0.0871
(0.61) (0.58) (0.66)
Leverage Firm 0.822*** 0.815*** 0.823***
(9.17) (9.13) (9.07)
Loan Size Loan -0.0860*** -0.0861*** -0.0862***
(-7.66) (-7.66) (-7.64)
Loan Maturity Loan 0.0286 0.0297 0.0293
(1.56) (1.62) (1.60)
Log(Syndicate Size) Loan 0.0180 0.0156 0.0159
(0.89) (0.77) (0.78)
Covenant indicator Loan -0.172*** -0.173*** -0.170***
(-5.31) (-5.38) (-5.36)
Leading Index Macroeconomic -0.276*** -0.278*** -0.276***
(-11.71) (-11.96) (-12.20)
Firm & Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.665 0.663 0.661
N 14333 14333 14336
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01 t statistics in parentheses26
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Table 1.8. Impact of Regulatory capital Ratio - DID approach SCAP Failure
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Group AID Spread AID Spread AID Spread
SCAP 32.27*** 31.52*** 41.03***
(5.36) (4.87) (6.78)
SCAP Fail 46.53*** 47.22*** 46.30***
(5.75) (5.94) (5.72)
RBC to RWA BHC 4.626***
(4.65)
Tier 1 to RWA BHC 4.270***
(3.81)
Tier 1 to Asset BHC 2.554
(1.07)
Size BHC 0.0149 0.0205 -0.00286
(0.64) (0.93) (-0.14)
Liquidity BHC 1.221*** 1.160*** 1.638***
(6.15) (5.64) (8.29)
PPNR BHC 6.271*** 4.759** 4.567*
(2.91) (2.14) (1.82)
Provisions BHC 17.08*** 20.78*** 19.76***
(3.80) (4.55) (4.01)
Charge-Offs BHC 74.62*** 75.92*** 71.10***
(3.77) (3.81) (3.53)
Deposit Expense BHC -29.17*** -27.03*** -30.07***
(-4.24) (-3.98) (-4.66)
Funding Expense BHC -4.980 -4.409 -2.299
(-0.70) (-0.62) (-0.29)
Size Firm -0.0873*** -0.0904*** -0.0797***
(-4.34) (-4.51) (-3.89)
ROA Firm -2.032*** -2.031*** -2.047***
(-4.73) (-4.72) (-4.79)
Liquidity Firm 0.175 0.174 0.191
(1.45) (1.43) (1.58)
Leverage Firm 0.823*** 0.821*** 0.829***
(8.83) (8.80) (8.91)
Loan Size Loan -0.0833*** -0.0830*** -0.0817***
(-7.06) (-7.03) (-6.94)
Loan Maturity Loan 0.0241 0.0254 0.0268
(1.30) (1.37) (1.41)
Log(Syndicate Size) Loan 0.0144 0.0120 0.0121
(0.69) (0.57) (0.56)
Covenant Indicator Loan -0.217*** -0.217*** -0.216***
(-7.39) (-7.32) (-7.15)
Leading Index Macroeconomic -0.273*** -0.272*** -0.277***
(-11.21) (-11.27) (-10.89)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.661 0.660 0.658
N 14333 14333 14336
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01 t statistics in parentheses 27
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Table 1.9. Impact of Regulatory capital ratio - DID approach incl. CCAR
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Group AID Spread AID Spread AID Spread
Regulatory Pressure 32.10*** 31.87*** 41.94***
(5.34) (4.91) (6.63)
Regulatory Pressure Fail 14.78** 14.81** 14.82**
(2.51) (2.53) (2.56)
RBC to RWA BHC 4.352***
(4.06)
Tier 1 to RWA BHC 3.892***
(3.25)
Tier 1 to Assets BHC 1.890
(0.74)
Size BHC 0.0163 0.0203 -0.00405
(0.71) (0.93) (-0.21)
Liquidity BHC 1.191*** 1.147*** 1.560***
(6.07) (5.60) (7.73)
PPNR BHC 6.628*** 5.238** 5.192**
(2.94) (2.27) (2.00)
Provisions BHC 24.98*** 28.53*** 27.26***
(4.58) (5.32) (4.80)
Charge-Offs BHC 68.38*** 69.44*** 66.00***
(3.22) (3.24) (3.04)
Deposit Expense BHC -30.21*** -28.32*** -31.15***
(-4.39) (-4.16) (-4.82)
Funding Expense BHC -4.038 -3.454 -1.637
(-0.58) (-0.50) (-0.21)
Log(Assets) Firm -0.109*** -0.113*** -0.105***
(-5.07) (-5.12) (-4.71)
ROA Firm -2.117*** -2.125*** -2.137***
(-5.04) (-5.04) (-5.08)
Liquidity Firm 0.195 0.194 0.209
(1.33) (1.32) (1.42)
Leverage Firm 0.800*** 0.797*** 0.804***
(8.77) (8.73) (8.80)
Loan Size Loan -0.0837*** -0.0833*** -0.0822***
(-7.11) (-7.08) (-7.00)
Loan Maturity Loan 0.0275 0.0288 0.0300
(1.47) (1.53) (1.56)
Log(Syndicate Size) Loan 0.0152 0.0130 0.0133
(0.73) (0.62) (0.62)
Covenant Indicator Loan -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.226***
(-7.63) (-7.57) (-7.46)
Leading Index Macroeconomic -0.297*** -0.297*** -0.301***
(-11.62) (-11.67) (-11.25)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.657 0.657 0.655
N 14333 14333 14336
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01 t statistics in parentheses28
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1.6 Robustness Tests
In this section we conduct a series of robustness tests.
1.6.1 Excluding crisis period
To test whether our results are solely being driven by the crisis period, we re-estimate our
regression for sub-samples that exclude the periods 2008Q1-2009Q4 or 2008Q1-2010Q4. We
present the results in Table 1.10. The estimates for a 1 percentage point increase in the
regulatory capital ratio now range from 4.78 to 7.23 basis points, which is quantitative similar
to our estimates over the entire sample and signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. There is no
qualitative change in our control variables.
1.6.2 Did ﬁrm quality drive our ﬁndings?
Even though the ﬁrms in our sample are in Compustat10 and we control for the credit rating,
our results may be driven by non-investment grade ﬁrms (deﬁned as ﬁrms with a credit rating
lower than BBB-). To address this concern we estimate our model for the sub-samples of
investment and non-investment grade ﬁrms. Firms rated above BBB- are classiﬁed as invest-
ment grade. W include un-rated ﬁrms in the non-investment grade sub-sample. Columns 1 to
6 of Table 1.11 present the results for non-investment and investment grade ﬁrms, respectively.
The effects are signiﬁcant for both sub-samples.
1.6.3 Pro-rata loan Allocation
In our main results, we match every loan to a lead bank. However, this might lead to a bias
in our ﬁndings depending on the capitalization of the lead bank. Therefore we re-estimate
equation 1.1 after allocating equal amounts of the syndicated loan to all Tier1 Agents.11 We
ﬁnd qualitatively similar to our main estimation and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
The results are reported in Table 1.12.
10Data coverage includes all active and inactive ﬁrms that have traded on a U.S. stock exchange.
11We allocate up-to 10 Tier1 agents. This comprises 99 percent of our matched sample.
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Table 1.10. Impact of Regulatory Capital Ratio - Excluding crisis period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Group Excluding 2008Q1-2009Q4 Excluding 2008Q1-2010Q4
RBC to RWA BHC 4.941*** 5.579***
(5.16) (5.31)
Tier1 to RWA BHC 4.777*** 5.285***
(4.72) (4.67)
Tier1 to Assets BHC 6.625*** 7.226***
(4.35) (4.88)
Log(Assets) BHC 0.248*** 0.252*** 0.269*** 0.208*** 0.212*** 0.232***
(6.34) (6.43) (7.40) (5.92) (6.01) (7.38)
PPNR BHC 9.653*** 8.494*** 7.611*** 8.259*** 6.885** 5.978**
(3.41) (2.95) (2.70) (3.14) (2.52) (2.20)
Liquidity BHC 0.580** 0.466* 0.969*** 0.599** 0.483* 1.040***
(2.48) (1.88) (3.97) (2.48) (1.90) (4.18)
Provisions 44.09*** 48.38*** 50.97*** 30.95*** 36.01*** 39.27***
(6.67) (7.74) (8.19) (6.04) (7.37) (7.71)
Charge-Offs BHC 84.02*** 84.43*** 79.60*** 81.29*** 81.76*** 76.56***
(3.72) (3.74) (3.59) (4.25) (4.27) (4.00)
Deposit Expense BHC -16.80** -14.50** -14.49** -16.05** -13.42** -13.45*
(-2.46) (-2.10) (-2.01) (-2.48) (-2.03) (-1.94)
Funding Expense BHC -24.46*** -24.11*** -23.04*** -24.12*** -23.73*** -22.61***
(-4.78) (-4.75) (-4.29) (-4.46) (-4.41) (-3.97)
Log (Assets) Firm -0.0902*** -0.0949*** -0.0918*** -0.0804*** -0.0854*** -0.0810***
(-4.02) (-4.27) (-4.36) (-3.79) (-4.06) (-4.18)
ROA Firm -2.155*** -2.156*** -2.161*** -2.435*** -2.434*** -2.431***
(-4.76) (-4.74) (-4.79) (-4.84) (-4.82) (-4.82)
Liquidity Firm 0.136 0.134 0.146 0.0999 0.101 0.113
(1.02) (1.01) (1.10) (0.74) (0.74) (0.84)
Leverage Firm 0.805*** 0.799*** 0.806*** 0.796*** 0.789*** 0.799***
(9.10) (9.08) (9.04) (8.79) (8.78) (8.74)
Log (Tranche Amount) Loan -0.0881*** -0.0881*** -0.0881*** -0.0842*** -0.0842*** -0.0844***
(-7.50) (-7.50) (-7.48) (-7.14) (-7.14) (-7.13)
Log (Maturity) Loan 0.0319* 0.0334* 0.0337* 0.0382** 0.0397** 0.0401**
(1.80) (1.89) (1.90) (2.15) (2.26) (2.26)
Log ( Syndicate Size) Loan 0.0168 0.0146 0.0142 0.00183 -0.000642 -0.00109
(0.81) (0.70) (0.68) (0.09) (-0.03) (-0.05)
Covenant Indicator Loan -0.180*** -0.180*** -0.176*** -0.173*** -0.173*** -0.169***
(-5.41) (-5.43) (-5.37) (-5.27) (-5.29) (-5.18)
Leading Index Macroeconomic -0.243*** -0.246*** -0.253*** -0.235*** -0.238*** -0.246***
(-8.09) (-7.99) (-8.20) (-7.37) (-7.22) (-7.50)
Firm & Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.662 0.660 0.658 0.663 0.663 0.661
N 13384 13384 13387 12858 12858 12861
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01 t statistics in parentheses
1.6.4 Placebo Tests
Following Berger and Roman (2013), we conduct a placebo test to mitigate concerns that
unobserved effects might be driving the results of our DID approach. We assume that the
30
1.6 Robustness Tests
stress tests conducted by the Federal Reserve were carried out in the aftermath of the dot-com
bubble. The dummy Placebo is now equal to one for the period 2001Q2-2006Q4. Placebo Fail
is the DID variable corresponding to SCAP Fail in equation (1.2). Results are reported in Table
1.13. The effect of being subjected to the ﬁctional SCAP on the AID spread is negative and in
some cases signiﬁcant with different measures of the capital ratio as a control variable. The
result implies that BHCs subjected to SCAP were actually charging a lower spread compared
to their peers prior to the ﬁnancial crisis. This provides further support for our claim of stress-
testing being a source of regulatory pressure on BHCs with real costs. The coefﬁcients on fake
SCAP failure are all insigniﬁcantly different from zero.
1.6.5 Program Evaluation style DID estimator
We provide further evidence for BHCs charging a higher spread as a consequence of SCAP
failure. The threshold for being subjected to SCAP was 2008 year-end assets of $100 billion.
We restrict our sample to these BHCs and estimate the following DID speciﬁcation:
AIDspreadi , j ,t = δ1SC AP Fai li +δ2SC AP Fai li ∗Post SC APt +β2Firmi , j ,t−1
+β3Banki ,t−1+β5Loani , j ,t +β4Timet + f j +σi j t (1.4)
SCAP Fail is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the BHC failed SCAP and required to raise capital.
Post SCAP is a dummy equal to 1 for the period between SCAP and CCAR 2011, namely, 2009Q2-
2010Q4. SCAP Fail * Post SCAP is the DID term of interest. We estimate equation1.4 with
identical ﬁrm, loan and BHC variables as before and include a full set of time dummies. The
results are presented in Table1.14. The positive coefﬁcient on the DID term indicates that
BHCs failing the SCAP charged a higher spread compared to their stress-tested peers between
2009Q2-2010Q4.
1.6.6 Loan growth estimation
The two main dimensions along which a contraction in credit supply can manifest itself are
loan volume and loan pricing. We have shown thus far that an increase in regulated bank
capital ratios affect loan spreads in the syndicated loan market. To test the importance of loan
volume, we estimate the following loan growth regression based on Khwaja and Mian (2008) &
Acharya et al. (2016).
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Loan growthi , j ,t = β1ΔCapi tali ,t−1+β2ΔRWAi ,t−1+β3Banki ,t−1
+Firm cluster ∗Quar ter j ,t +Firm cluster ∗BHCj ,i
+σi j t (1.5)
The starting point for this estimation is our matched dataset with pro-rata loan allocation
across tier 1 agents. While our dataset has a large number of ﬁrm-bank pairs, we do not have
same pairs repeating every quarter. Therefore, following Acharya et al. (2016), we aggregate
loans based on industry and credit ratings by each BHC every quarter. We calculate the three
year median interest coverage ratio and assign ratings based on categories provided by Poor’s
(2006).12 Thus our unit of observation is the ﬁrm cluster-BHC-quarter. Loan growth is the
quarterly change in loan volume by BHC, i to ﬁrm-cluster,j. To control for demand over time
and any common characteristics shared by ﬁrms in the cluster, we introduce ﬁrm-cluster
times quarter ﬁxed effects. To control for BHC heterogeneity and any relationships between
ﬁrm-cluster and BHC, we interact ﬁrm-cluster and BHC ﬁxed effects. Our regression also
includes the same BHC controls as before. We present our results in Table 1.15. Consistent
with the narrative of a contraction in credit supply, we ﬁnd the coefﬁcient on total risk-based
capital growth and tier 1 capital growth to be negative.
12Only about half of our sample ﬁrms have a credit rating assigned in Compustat.
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Table 1.11. Robustness Tests - Firm Quality
(Investment Grade) (Non-Investment Grade & Un-rated)
AID Spread AID Spread AID Spread AID Spread AID Spread AID Spread
RBC to RWA 4.600*** 5.274***
(3.50) (4.95)
Tier 1 to RWA 5.821*** 5.193***
(4.03) (4.70)
Tier 1 to Assets 9.008*** 7.016***
(4.64) (4.34)
BHC Size 0.220*** 0.202*** 0.238*** 0.225*** 0.233*** 0.246***
(4.68) (4.25) (5.43) (4.94) (5.12) (5.69)
BHC Liquidity 0.567 0.448 0.856** 0.477* 0.298 0.909***
(1.59) (1.28) (2.58) (1.74) (1.01) (3.23)
BHC PPNR 10.51*** 9.358*** 7.275** 12.08*** 10.92*** 10.07***
(3.22) (2.96) (2.33) (3.64) (3.22) (2.99)
BHC Provisions 50.18*** 51.48*** 54.89*** 49.46*** 53.85*** 56.20***
(7.50) (7.69) (8.73) (7.38) (8.34) (8.59)
BHC Charge-Offs 21.88 19.62 21.29 86.58*** 87.46*** 83.30***
(0.93) (0.84) (0.92) (3.87) (3.93) (3.82)
BHC Deposit Expense -6.342 -3.086 -4.511 -22.22*** -19.72** -19.48**
(-0.84) (-0.41) (-0.60) (-2.81) (-2.47) (-2.38)
BHC Funding Expense -21.98*** -21.23*** -18.20*** -22.46*** -22.25*** -21.16***
(-5.28) (-5.30) (-4.52) (-3.72) (-3.72) (-3.31)
Firm Size -0.0531 -0.0652* -0.0659** -0.0897*** -0.0955*** -0.0899***
(-1.60) (-1.97) (-2.02) (-3.33) (-3.56) (-3.47)
Firm ROA -2.387*** -2.351*** -2.317*** -1.893*** -1.895*** -1.902***
(-2.97) (-2.96) (-2.96) (-3.95) (-3.94) (-4.00)
Firm Liquidity 0.0810 0.0883 0.120 -0.0559 -0.0662 -0.0628
(0.51) (0.56) (0.79) (-0.34) (-0.40) (-0.38)
Firm Leverage 0.392*** 0.347*** 0.364*** 0.819*** 0.814*** 0.818***
(3.12) (2.77) (2.75) (7.58) (7.56) (7.53)
Log(Syndicate Size) 0.00303 0.00542 0.00897 0.0283 0.0249 0.0246
(0.12) (0.22) (0.36) (1.24) (1.09) (1.08)
Loan Size -0.00870 -0.00950 -0.00825 -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.105***
(-0.67) (-0.74) (-0.63) (-6.99) (-6.96) (-6.93)
Loan Maturity 0.0378*** 0.0385*** 0.0377*** -0.00939 -0.00922 -0.00984
(2.80) (2.92) (2.83) (-0.32) (-0.31) (-0.33)
Covenant Indicator 0.0622** 0.0555** 0.0529** -0.272*** -0.272*** -0.266***
(2.54) (2.35) (2.23) (-6.53) (-6.56) (-6.45)
Leading Index -0.293*** -0.300*** -0.296*** -0.285*** -0.286*** -0.284***
(-7.88) (-8.20) (-8.49) (-10.97) (-11.03) (-10.97)
Firm & Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3643 3643 3643 10690 10690 10693
Adj. R2 0.670 0.673 0.673 0.626 0.627 0.625
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01 t statistics in parentheses, standard errors clustered by date 33
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Table 1.12. Robustness Tests - Pro-rata loan allocation
(1) (2) (3)
AID Spread AID Spread AID Spread
RBC to RWA 2.718***
(5.53)
Tier 1 to RWA 3.677***
(6.72)
Tier 1 to Assets 9.002***
(9.71)
BHC Size 0.240*** 0.250*** 0.257***
(8.30) (8.42) (9.81)
BHC Liquidity 0.480*** 0.238 0.684***
(3.10) (1.45) (4.71)
BHC PPNR 8.281*** 7.860*** 6.635***
(5.51) (5.12) (4.56)
BHC Provisions 54.71*** 55.32*** 54.78***
(10.71) (11.44) (11.78)
BHC Charge-Offs 36.86** 40.30*** 33.32**
(2.48) (2.72) (2.34)
BHC Deposit Expense -23.83*** -21.65*** -19.80***
(-6.39) (-5.73) (-5.02)
BHC Funding Expense -15.68*** -16.13*** -13.69***
(-4.77) (-4.91) (-4.29)
Firm Size -0.0527*** -0.0681*** -0.0851***
(-2.78) (-3.53) (-4.52)
Firm ROA -2.806*** -2.801*** -2.785***
(-7.28) (-7.25) (-7.23)
Firm Liquidity 0.425*** 0.401*** 0.380***
(3.14) (2.95) (2.78)
Firm Leverage 0.672*** 0.652*** 0.643***
(6.99) (6.89) (6.65)
Loan Size -0.0585*** -0.0591*** -0.0600***
(-5.12) (-5.18) (-5.28)
Loan Maturity 0.0369* 0.0368* 0.0367*
(1.90) (1.92) (1.94)
Log(Syndicate Size) -0.00521 -0.0145 -0.0257
(-0.24) (-0.67) (-1.20)
Covenant Indicator -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.115***
(-3.33) (-3.45) (-4.06)
Leading Index -0.241*** -0.244*** -0.247***
(-9.97) (-10.26) (-11.33)
N 149416 149416 149475
Adj. R2 0.739 0.741 0.742
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01 t statistics in parentheses
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Table 1.13. Robustness Tests - Placebo test
(1) (2) (3)
Tier 1 to RWA Tier 1 to Asset RBC to RWA
Panel A: Based on lead bank matching
Placebo -0.0559 -0.0466 -0.0799*
(-1.30) (-1.08) (-1.82)
Placebo Fail -0.00148 -0.00780 0.0203
(-0.02) (-0.09) (0.25)
N 14333 14333 14336
adj. R2 0.653 0.652 0.648
Panel B: Based on pro-rata loan allocation
Placebo -0.184*** -0.174*** -0.181***
(-4.89) (-4.53) (-4.88)
Placebo Fail 0.0165 0.00719 0.0197
(0.34) (0.14) (0.39)
N 149416 149416 149475
Adj. R2 0.725 0.726 0.724
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01 t statistics in parentheses, standard errors clustered by date
Table 1.14. Robustness Tests - Program evaluation DID estimator
(1) (2) (3)
Tier 1 to RWA Tier 1 to Asset RBC to RWA
SCAP Fail 0.159 -0.005 0.349
(0.24) (-0.01) (0.46)
SCAP Fail*Post SCAP 5.966** 5.686** 5.726**
(2.72) (2.63) (2.60)
N 117467 117467 117467
Adj. R2 0.772 0.772 0.772
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01 t statistics in parentheses. clustered rssd
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Table 1.15. Robustness Tests - Loan Growth
(1) (2)
Loan Growth Loan Growth
Risk-based Capital Growth -3.916*
(-1.77)
Tier 1 Capital Growth -4.110**
(-2.35)
RWA Growth 2.866* 2.940**
(2.03) (2.04)
BHC Controls Yes Yes
Firm Cluster*Quarter FE Yes Yes
Firm Cluster* Bank FE Yes Yes
N 5522 5522
Adj. R2 0.626 0.626
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01, t statistics in parentheses, Errors clustered at the bank level
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1.7 Conclusions
This paper shows that higher bank capital has a statistically signiﬁcant impact on lending rates
charged by BHCs. By matching syndicated loan information with ﬁrm data from Compustat
and lending bank characteristics from the FR-Y9C reports for BHCs, we are able to condition
loan pricing on demand. Since syndicated loans are large loans made by a group of lenders,
our results in a way serve as a lower bound for the observed contraction in credit supply.
We expect the effects to be larger for smaller, unlisted ﬁrms solely reliant on bank funding.
We further ﬁnd that heightened regulatory oversight and stress test failure leads to higher
loan pricing. The results contribute to the recent policy debate on real economy effects of
bank capital regulation and provide quantitative insights for macro-prudential policy design.
However, higher capital reduces the probability of banking crises and associated losses in
economic output. The beneﬁts, therefore, need to be assessed vis-a-vis costs for improved
policy design.
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1.A Appendix: Variable Deﬁnitions
Table 1.16. Variable Deﬁnitions
Variable FR Y-9C/Compustat Data Item Explanation
Bank Assets BHCK2170 Total assets
Bank Liquidity (BHCK0081 + Cash and Balances due from depository institutions
BHCK0395 + Interest bearing balances in U.S. Ofﬁces
BHCK0397 + Interest bearing balances in foreign ofﬁces
BHCKC225) / BHCK2170 Federal Funds sold and securities purchased
under agreements to sell
Net Income BHCK4340 Net Income
Loan Portfolio Losses BHCK4645/BHCK2170 Charge-offs on Commercial and Industrial loans
to U.S. addresses
Tier 1 BHCK8274 Tier 1 capital allowable under the risk-based
capital guidelines
Tier 2 BHCK8275 Tier 2 capital allowable under the risk-based
capital guidelines
Risk based capital BHCK3792 Total qualifying capital allowable under
the risk-based capital guidelines
RWA BHCKA223 Risk-weighted assets (net of allowances and other
deductions)
Firm Size atq Total Assets
Firm Liquidity cheq/atq Cash and Short-term Investments/Total Assets
Firm Proﬁtability niq/atq Net Income(Loss)/Total Assets
Firm Leverage dlttq/atq Debt in Long-Term Liabilities/Total Assets
Credit rating ltermcr Standard and Poor’s Long term Issuer Credit Rating
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1.B Appendix: Sample BHCs subjected to stress-tests
Table 1.17. Sample BHCs subjected to SCAP and CCAR
SCAP 2009 CCAR 2012 CCAR 2013
BNY Mellon BNY Mellon BNY Mellon
Bank of America Bank of America Bank of America
CitiGroup CitiGroup CitiGroup
Fifth Third Fifth Third Fifth Third
Goldman Sachs Goldman Sachs Goldman Sachs
J.P. Morgan J.P. Morgan J.P. Morgan
KeyCorp KeyCorp KeyCorp
Morgan Stanley Morgan Stanley Morgan Stanley
PNC PNC PNC
State Street State Street State Street
SunTrust SunTrust SunTrust
US Bancorp US Bancorp US Bancorp
Wells Fargo Wells Fargo Wells Fargo
Banks that failed stress tests are in boldface
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1.C Appendix: Syndicated Loan Types
Table 1.18. Loan Types
Loan Types
364d Revolver
Acquisition Financing
Bridge Loan
Delayed Draw Term Loan
First-Lien Term Loan
Letter of Credit
Revolving Credit/Term Loan A
Revolving Credit/Term Loan
Revolving Credit Facility
Second-Lien term Loan
Synthetic Lease
Term Loan
Term Loan A
Term Loan B
Term Loan C
Term Loan D
Term Loan E
Third-Lien term Loan
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1.D Appendix: Probit Regression Results
Table 1.19. Marginal effects of each co-variate on failure probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Liquidity -0.313
(0.202)
PPNR -5.379
(8.220)
Provisions 9.072
(6.305)
Charge-Offs 127.9*
(76.71)
Deposit Expense 31.04*
(17.91)
Funding Expense 28.18
(18.84)
Leading Index -0.0838***
(0.0234)
N 104 104 104 104 104 104 104
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01,Standard errors calculated using delta method in parentheses
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1.E Appendix: Risk-based vs. non-risk-based capital measures
We mentioned in section 1.2 that our methodology is closest to Santos and Winton (2013), who
estimate a similar equation using Call report data om stockholder equity over asset and ﬁnd
a small but negative effect of the capital ratio on lending spreads . We re-estimate equation
1.1 using total equity capital to asset ratio13 as the capital measure and restricting our sample
period to 2007Q2. We too ﬁnd a small negative impact of capital on loan spreads up-to 2007Q2
as reported in column 1 of Table 1.20. In column 2, we extend the sample to 2015Q4 and ﬁnd a
positive and statistically signiﬁcant effect. Finally, for the sample between 2007Q3 and 2015Q4,
we ﬁnd a positive signiﬁcant effect. On the other hand, our risk-based capital measure are
positive and signiﬁcant in all three subsamples. We interpret this result as suggesting that
regulation on risk-weights contributed to higher lending spreads since its inception while
higher capital has contributed since the increase in capital requirements. Our results, therefore,
add a new dimension to Santon and Winston’s ﬁndings from a policy perspective.
Table 1.20. Impact of Non-Risk-Based Equity to Asset on AID Spread
(1) (2) (3)
Up-to 2007Q2 Up to 2015Q4 2007Q3 - 2015Q4
Non-risk-based equity to Assets -3.86∗∗∗ 3.04∗∗∗ 4.96∗∗
(-2.74) (2.78) (2.65)
N 9355 15210 5855
Adj. R2 0.647 0.660 0.680
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01 t statistics in parentheses
13Santos and Winton (2013) deﬁne their capital measure as shareholder equity to assets
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1.F Appendix: Effect of Risk-Weighted Asset Density
We documented a decrease in the ratio of RWAs to asset during and after the ﬁnancial crisis
(Figure 1.8). A decrease in the RWA density implies that a BHC is holding more assets with a
lower risk-weight. This asset portfolio choice can lead to an increase in cost of loans to ﬁrms if
BHCs choose to pass on the cost of higher capital required against these loans vis-a-vis safer
assets. Alternatively, if a lowering in the RWA density makes a BHC safer and lowers the overall
borrowing cost, it can choose to charge lower rates on loans to ﬁrms. We test for the effect of
RWA density by adding it as an explanatory variable in our baseline speciﬁcation outlined in
equation 2.1 along with the Tier1 to asset ratio as the main explanatory variable. The results
tabulated in Table 1.21. We ﬁnd the effect of RWA density to be negative and signiﬁcant. This
indicates that banks with a lower RWA density charge a higher spread for lending to ﬁrms.
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Table 1.21. Effect of RWA density on AID Spread
(1)
Variable Group AID Spread
Tier1 to Assets BHC 8.631***
(5.92)
RWA Density BHC -1.120***
(-4.71)
Size BHC 0.213***
(5.83)
Liquidity BHC 0.602**
(2.30)
PPNR BHC 9.794***
(3.47)
Provisions BHC 50.24***
(8.51)
Loan Losses BHC 70.72***
(3.45)
Deposit Expense BHC -11.67*
(-1.78)
Funding Expense BHC -24.87***
(-5.70)
Size Firm -0.102***
(-5.26)
ROA ﬁrm -1.904***
(-4.64)
Liquidity Firm 0.0676
(0.51)
Leverage Firm 0.819***
(9.17)
Loan Size Loan -0.0855***
(-7.56)
Loan Maturity Loan 0.0295
(1.60)
Log (Syndicate Size) Loan 0.0117
(0.57)
Covenant Indicator Loan -0.176***
(-5.65)
Leading Index Macroeconomic -0.280***
(-12.14)
Firm & Bank FE Yes
N 14333
adj. R2 0.670
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01 t statistics in parentheses
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2 Bank Capital and Firm Lending: The
Case for Switzerland 1
Joint work with Prof. Luisa Lambertini (EPFL), Dr. Dan Wunderli (SNB), and Dr. Robert Bichsel
(SNB)
2.1 Introduction
In response to the recent ﬁnancial crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and
national regulatory authorities have undertaken a number of reforms to enhance the ability
of banks and the banking system to weather a future crisis. These have primarily focused
on raising the quantity and quality of capital held by banks. Higher capital requirements
aim to make banks less susceptible to ﬁnancial shocks and thereby mitigate a credit crunch
in adverse scenarios. However, if higher capital raises the cost of ﬁnancing for banks, this
may translate into lower ﬁnancial intermediation and higher borrowing costs for ﬁrms and
households. Therefore, it is important from a policy standpoint to analyze the effect of higher
capital requirements on bank lending.
This paper investigates the impact of higher capital requirements on loan spreads
offered to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms in Switzerland. A number of other studies have looked at loan
quantity or pricing and whether they have been affected by higher capital. However, national
regulators usually have identical capital requirements for all banks. Therefore, it is difﬁcult to
differentiate between the effect of capital and other demand conditions common to all banks.
Switzerland with a large and heterogeneous banking sector provides an excellent laboratory
for this study. In addition to Swiss regulatory authorities being at the forefront of capital
1The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the Swiss
National Bank.
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regulation, different groups of banks have had time varying capital targets. This allows us to
not only assess the cost of each incremental unit of capital ratio on loan spreads but also how
deviation from the supervisory target affects this pricing.
We use a rich new conﬁdential dataset on new credit granted to ﬁrms in Switzerland.
We match this with supervisory data on bank capital and capital requirements. We use the
matched dataset to analyze the impact of bank capital on credit supply along two different
dimensions - pricing and volume. We also test for a permanent effect of higher capital on new
credit growth. We ﬁnd that banks to increase the loan spread and reduce loan growth in order
to attain higher capital ratios. While statistically signiﬁcant, the effects are economically small.
We do not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant permanent effect of higher capital ratios on new credit
growth.
The rest of paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature. Section 2.3
provides a short review on capital regulation in Switzerland. Section 2.4 describes the data
and presents descriptive evidence. Section 2.5 explains our empirical methodology. Section
presents our results. Section 2.7 presents robustness checks. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
The aftermath of the recent ﬁnancial crisis has witnessed a wave of regulatory changes towards
strengthening capital requirements. Thereby, an active debate on the costs and beneﬁts of
higher capital has ensued.
The Modigliani-Miller (Modigliani and Miller (1958)) theorem is the basis of the debate
on higher capital requirements. Per the MM hypothesis, the capital structure is irrelevant in a
frictionless environment. This would imply that the intermediation capacity of a bank will
not be constrained by equity. However, there are conditions under which the MM hypothesis
breaks down and an increase in equity is maybe costly. Aiyar et al. (2014) list the conditions
under which equity ﬁnance is costly and provide empirical evidence on the negative impact of
higher capital requirements on bank lending. These cases include favorable tax treatment of
debt, deposit insurance, and adverse selection costs of raising external equity.
The impact of capital requirements on bank lending has been an area of active research.
Pre-Basel I implementation studies include those by Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Hancock
and A. (1993). Bernanke and Lown analyze the impact of bank capital on lending during the
1990-1991 recession in the United States and ﬁnd that a 1 percentage point increase in the
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capital to asset ratio contributed to a 2.6 percentage point increase in loan growth. Hancock
and Wilcox analyze bank credit ﬂows in 1990 using data on U.S. commercial banks with assets
greater than 300 million dollars. They test the hypothesis that banks have an internal target
ratio and credit growth depends on the divergence from this target. They ﬁnd a reduction of
about 1.4 dollars in bank credit for every dollar of capital target shortfall.
After the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008, a number of studies across different jurisdictions have
estimated the impact of bank capital requirements on lending to ﬁrms. Francis and Osborne
(2009) estimate an internal capital target for U.K. banks during the period 1996-2007 and
quantify how deviation form this target affects loan supply. They ﬁnd stronger credit growth
for banks which had surplus capital relative to target. They ﬁnd that a 1 percentage point
increase in capital requirements results in a 0.65 percentage point rise in the target capital
ratio. The adjustment to the desired target takes four years and results in a 1.16 percentage
point decrease in loan volume. Also for the United Kingdom, Bridges et al. (2014)study the
impact of capital requirements on individual banks between 1990 and 2011. They ﬁnd a 1
percentage point increase in capital requirements reduces loan growth to private non-ﬁnancial
corporations by 3.9 percentage points in the following year. Berrospide and Edge (2010) use
quarterly data on U.S. Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) between 1992 to 2009 to analyze the
impact of bank capital on lending. They ﬁnd an increase of 0.7 - 1.2 percentage point in loan
growth for a 1 percentage point increase in the capital ratio. Labonne and Lamé (2014) utilize
data from French banks between 2003 and 2011 to study the sensitivity of corporate lending to
capital ratios and supervisory capital requirements. They ﬁnd that an increase of 1 percentage
point in the Tier 1 capital to asset ratio corresponds to a 1 percentage increase in credit growth.
Dagher et al. (2016) review some of the extant literature and report the impact of a 1 percentage
point increase in capital requirements on lending spreads to be in the range of 2 to 20 basis
points. Cohen (2013) and Cecchetti (2014) corroborate this consensus in empirical ﬁndings in
the context of Basel III.
A small number of studies analyze the capital behavior of banks in Switzerland and the
impact of capital regulation on the Swiss economy. Rime (2001) uses a simultaneous equation
model with capital and risk for the period 1989-1995 and ﬁnds that swiss banks increase
their capital ratios by increasing capital and not by reducing Risk-Weighted Assets (RWAs).
Using bank balance sheet data, Junge and Kugler (2013) estimate the increase in weighted
average cost of capital as result of higher common equity tier 1 capital (CET1) requirement
for Swiss banks and predict the resulting increase in loan rates for the non-ﬁnancial sector to
be in the range of 0.6 - 1.6 basis points. Our study contributes to this literature by using the
novel loan-level data set matched with supervisory data on bank balance sheets and capital
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requirements.
2.3 Capital Regulation in Switzerland
We begin by deﬁning the capital measures used in our study,
1. CET1 Capital (core capital) predominantly consists of paid-in, disclosed reserves, after-
tax retained earnings;
2. Additional Tier 1 (AT1) Capital primarily includes paid-in capital not eligible as CET1 ,
and perpetual capital contingent instruments;
3. Tier 2 (T2) Capital (supplementary capital) primarily includes ﬁxed maturity capital
contingent instruments and subordinated term debt;
4. Leverage ratio is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total assets.
5. Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) are computed by weighting different asset classes and/or
off-balance sheet exposures by a corresponding risk-weight.
At the beginning of our sample period (2006), every bank in Switzerland needed to
fulﬁll the minimum Basel capital requirements of 8% capital to RWAs plus an additional
20% ("Swiss Finish"), resulting in a total capital-to-RWA requirement of 9.6%. From there
onwards, capital requirements were increased piece-meal for different bank groups. In 2007,
the requirement for the two big banks, Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) and Credit Suisse
(CS), was increased from 9.6% to 10.4%. In 2009, the requirement for these two banks was
increased from 9.6% to 18% to be phased-in by 2013. In 2011, Pillar 2 requirements 2 for
all banks were introduced in Switzerland. Five groups of banks are determined using the
following four variables: Size of bank’s balance sheet, assets under management, priviliged
deposits, amount of total minimum capital requirements (as the level, not as RWA). From 2011
onwards, regulatory targets in Switzerland were not only formulated in terms of total capital,
but also in terms of CET1 , Tier 1 (T1), AT1 and T2 capital. We tabulate these requirements for
each bank category in Table2.1. Capital requirements for UBS and CS (Category 1 banks) are
being determined annually starting 2012.
2"Pillar 2 covers the supervisory review process which ensures that banks have sufﬁcient capital to back all risks
and also requires appropriate management of these risks." - Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority, FINMA
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Table 2.1. Capital Requirements for Swiss Banks starting 2011
Bank Group Total Capital Requirements (%) CET 1(%) AT1 (%) T2 (%)
Category 2 13.6-14.4 8.7-9.2 2.1-2.2 2.8-3.0
Category 3 12 7.8 1.8 2.4
Category 4 11.2 7.4 1.6 2.2
Category 5 10.5 7 1.5 2
Source: FINMA circular 2011/2
Additionally, from 2012 onwards, the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) regulation3 took effect. In
Switzerland, the Swiss National Bank (SNB), designates institutions that are TBTF. The Swiss
Financial Markets Regulatory Authority (FINMA) then elaborates in an institution-speciﬁc
decree what this means for the TBTF-bank in terms of regulatory targets on capital, liquidity,
and large exposures. As a result of this process, there have been instituion-speciﬁc capital
targets for UBS and Credit Suisse (CS) starting 2012, and for the cantonal bank of Zurich (ZKB)
from 2014 onwards. The more recent designation of two more banks as systemically important
(Raiffeisen-Group (Switzerland) and PostFinance) is outside our sample period.
2.4 Data & Descriptive Evidence
For our analysis, we utilize multiple conﬁdential datasets of the Swiss National Bank (SNB).
The loan level data is obtained from the lending rate statistics (KREDZ). Every new loan
arrangement is reported at a monthly frequency, starting 2006Q3, by all banks whose total
lending to non-ﬁnancial corporations exceeds CHF 2 billion. A new loan arrangement is
deﬁned as new credit granted or an old credit to which signiﬁcant changes have been made
(e.g. change in maturity or pricing). Loan characteristics in KREDZ includes the price, size,
maturity, type, and type of collateral (if any). It includes ﬁrm location (canton), the industry
in which the ﬁrm operates, an identiﬁer for ﬁrm size, and a combined ﬁrm and loan risk
indicator. However it does not include an unique ﬁrm identiﬁer. This new dataset is one
of the strengths of our study as it allows us to use new credit granted as opposed to loan
stocks which have been commonly used in banking studies.4 The reporting banks account
for approximately 80 percent of the Swiss banking sector assets. We match this dataset with
3https://www.ﬁnma.ch/en/ /media/ﬁnma/dokumente/dokumentencenter/myﬁnma/faktenblaetter/faktenblatt-
schweizer-too-big-to-fail-regime-tbtf.pdf?la=en
4A few of the shortcomings in using loan stocks for analysis are that it can be inﬂuenced by write-offs, changes
in reporting, exchange-rate effects etc.
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supervisory data on capital requirements, capital and bank characteristics.5 Our matched
panel dataset includes data from 2006Q3 until 2014Q4. Table 2.2 presents the summary
statistics on key loan characteristics and bank capital. Loan spread is the interest rate charged
on the loan over the 3-month CHF LIBOR.
Loan Characteristics:
There are three main dimensions along which a change in credit supply can occur; pricing,
volume, and maturity. We analyze quarterly behavior for each of these. In Figure 2.1, we plot
the loan spread weighted by the loan size. There is a decrease in the spread from the starting
point of our sample until 2008Q3. This decrease was driven by an increase in the 3 month CHF
LIBOR during that period. This is consistent with the compression in spreads across asset
classes globally in the lead up to the GFC (Walutowy and IMF (2007)). In 2008Q4, there is a
spike in the spread and it has remained at that level till the end of our sample period in 2014Q4.
The increase in spread in 2008Q4 can be attributed to the onset of the global ﬁnancial crisis
(GFC). Next, we plot the quarterly issuance of loan arrangements in Figure 2.2. The sharp
increase in 2008Q3 and 2008Q4 is not related to a crisis phenomena but rather to the fact
that banks were given a deadline of year-end 2008 to match the required reporting standards.
Broadly we have two kinds of credit in our dataset, ﬁxed maturity loans and credit lines. While
the relative volume of ﬁxed maturity loans and credit lines reported was comparable prior to
2008Q3, they now comprise less than 10 percent of quarterly loan arrangements as reported in
our dataset. Therefore the increase in loan volume is not due to a drawing down on credit lines
as reported by Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) for U.S. ﬁrms. Further, the increase was not
driven by a speciﬁc type of loan within the ﬁxed maturity category. We report the frequency
of loan categories over the entire sample and up-to 2008Q4 in Appendix 3.A.6 Last, Figure
2.3 plots the size-weighted loan maturity. It shows that the size weighted maturity of new
loan arrangements during our sample period is approximately one year. The ﬁgure does not
reveal any sharp shortening or lengthening in maturity. Overall, characteristics of new loan
arrangements indicate an increase in spread at the onset the GFC but no discernible change
in the aggregate volume or maturity. If anything, the volume shows an increase.
Firm Characteristics:
The next part of the analysis deals with sample ﬁrm characteristics. Firms in our sample are
classiﬁed into 6 size categories based on total assets. The cutoffs are CHF 1 Million, CHF 5
Million, CHF 25 Million, CHF 100 Million and greater than CHF 100 Million. The remaining
5Banks report at the individual level and/or at the highest level of consolidation. Where applicable, we use the
highest level of consolidation for our analysis.
6Additionally, this increase in loans was not driven by any single or group of banks. We cannot report individual
bank data due to data conﬁdentiality.
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category is when size was reported as ’unspeciﬁed’ by the bank. We assign an indicator variable
taking values between 1 and 5 for the size categories and 0 for the unspeciﬁed. Figure 2.4
indicates that the majority of ﬁrms in our sample have total assets less than CHF 5 Million.7
Additionally, we have composite measure of ﬁrm and loan riskiness which we label probability
of default (PD) class. This is also categorized into 5 classes ranging from low to high and a
sixth class for unspeciﬁed observations. We attach an indicator variable like we did for ﬁrm
size categories.8 Figure 2.5 indicates that there was an increase in riskiness as measured by
PD class for credit granted starting 2008Q4. While the ﬁrm size measure does not reveal a
substantial time-series variation, there is some evidence for an increase in the riskiness of for
our combined measure of loan and ﬁrm risk.
Bank Capital Characteristics:9
The last part of our aggregate analysis presents the evolution of bank capital measures. We use
three measures of the regulated capital ratio: Total Risk-based capital to RWAs, Tier 1 capital
to RWAs, and Tier 1 Capital to Assets (Tier 1 leverage ratio). We observe a gradual increase
in these measures starting 2008Q4 as shown in Figure 2.6. The sharper increase in the Tier 1
to RWA ratio compared to the Tier 1 leverage ratio indicates that part of the increase can be
attributed to a reduction in RWAs. We further breakdown capital, assets, and RWAs in Figures
2.7 and 2.8. We observe a sharp increase in tier 1 capital and a corresponding increase in total
capital between 2008Q3 and 2008Q4 and a gradual increase thereafter (Figure 2.7). At the
same time, both assets and RWAs fell as illustrated in panel A of Figure 2.8. Finally, panel B of
Figure 2.8 shows that the ratio of RWAs to total assets of the Swiss banking sector has fallen
from nearly 56% to 47% during our sample period. Aggregate evidence suggests that Swiss
banks have adjusted to higher required capital ratios by both increasing capital and reducing
RWAs.
7We report the frequency of ﬁrms in each category of ﬁrm size in Appendix 2.B.
8We report the frequency of ﬁrms in each category of PD class in Appendix 2.C.
9Bank balance sheet variables are reported monthly. However income statement variables and capital is
reported semi-annually. Retained earnings are reported annually. To construct our capital measures, we allocate
retained earnings based on half-yearly proﬁts. Further, after adjusting for retained earnings, we interpolate capital
for quarters 1 and 3.
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Table 2.2. Summary Statistics
Variable Units N Mean SD p5 p95
Loan Spread Percent 961776 2.431034 1.872321 .4536909 6.452577
Log Loan Amount Log 961776 6.012401 1.426385 3.912023 8.594154
Loan Maturity Years 582855 2.206638 2.739894 .0821355 7.997262
Total Capital to RWA Ratio 961776 .163869 .0341088 .1132485 .220021
Tier 1 Capital to RWA Ratio 961776 .1406153 .0322714 .0809856 .1924206
Tier 1 Capital to Assets Ratio 961776 .0623182 .0196076 .032893 .1018963
Log Bank Assets Log 961776 18.55921 1.589015 16.43554 20.61067
Figure 2.1. Weighted Average Loan Spread
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Figure 2.2. Total Volume of New Loan Arrangements
Figure 2.3. Weighted Average Loan Maturity
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Figure 2.4. Weighted Average Firm Size
Figure 2.5. Weighted Average Probability of Default Class
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Figure 2.6. Mean Capital Ratios
Figure 2.7. Total and Tier 1 Capital
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Figure 2.8. Total Assets and Risk-Weighted Assets (RWAs)
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2.5 Empirical Model
2.5.1 Loan Spread Base Speciﬁcation
To estimate the impact of regulated capital ratios on loan spreads, we estimate the following
equation:
ri , j ,t = β1Ki ,t−1+β2Devi ,t−1+β3Banki ,t−1+β4(Firm & Loan) j ,t +
Bank Fixed E f f ect s+Time Fixed E f f ect s+i , j ,t (2.1)
ri , j ,t measures the spread between the interest rate and 3-month CHF libor for each new
loan arrangement. All independent variables are lagged one period to avoid simultaneity.
Ki ,t−1 denotes the measure of the capital ratio. To account for asymmetry introduced due to
supervisory capital requirements, we include the dummy, Devi ,t−1. The dummy takes a value
of 1 if the actual capital ratio is greater than the supervisory target and 0 otherwise. Banki ,t−1
is a vector of bank-speciﬁc characteristics, namely Size ( log of total assets), Liquidity (cash to
assets), Debt (medium term notes and bonds to assets), ROA (net income to assets). The vector
Firm & Loan includes controls for ﬁrm size, industry, loan amount, loan type, and collateral
type. To distinguish between ﬁxed maturity loans and credit lines, we include the indicator
variable, Credi t Line Dummy . It take a value equal to 1 if the loan has a ﬁxed maturity, 0
otherwise. Further we estimate equation 2.1 separately for these two types of loans. Bank
ﬁxed effects control for any unobserved systematic heterogeneity at the bank level. Time ﬁxed
effects control for macroeconomic conditions and any demand effects common to all banks
at a given point in time. In equation 2.1, β1 greater than 0 would imply that a higher level of
bank capital ratio causes an increase in loan spreads.
2.5.2 Asymmetric Effects
We attempt to further delineate the impact of any asymmetry introduced by supervisory
capital requirements. From a regulatory standpoint, for a bank i , the important question is
how far its capital Ki ,t is below or above the supervisory requirement, K ∗i ,t . In the ﬁrst case,
that is if Ki ,t −K ∗i ,t < 0, the bank is short of capital. As a result, the bank needs to build up
capital K , e.g. by higher retained earnings or by issuing capital instruments. As an alternative,
the bank may decrease its RWA if the bank is short of capital in the risk-weighted dimension
only. In the second case, that is if Ki ,t −K ∗i ,t > 0, the bank is capitalized well enough and there
are no immediate reasons as to why the bank should charge a higher spread. In addition
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to this asymmetry, the distance of K from K ∗i ,t will determine how a bank reacts. If a bank’s
capital Ki ,t is far above its target K ∗i ,t , it will face fewer restrictions than if Ki ,t is only marginally
above K ∗i ,t . We account for this asymmetry in Ki ,t −K ∗i ,t by creating dummy variables I[a,b) for
different buckets of size two percentage points for Ki ,t −K ∗i ,t . E.g., if −4%<Ki ,t −K ∗i ,t <−2%,
the dummy I(−4,−2] = 1. If 0%<Ki ,t −K ∗i ,t < 2%, the dummy I(0,2] = 1. The coefﬁcients, β2 to
β6, measure extent to which under-capitalized or well-capitalized banks react in terms of loan
spreads. We augment our baseline speciﬁcation and estimate equation 2.210.
ri , j ,t = β1Ki ,t−1+β2I(−2,0]+β3I(0,2]+ . . .β6I(8,+∞)+β7Firm j ,t−1+β8Banki ,t−1
+Bank Fixed E f f ect s+Time Fixed E f f ect s+i , j ,t (2.2)
2.5.3 Loan Growth Baseline Regression
The two main dimensions along which a contraction in credit supply can manifest itself are
loan volume and loan pricing. We have shown thus far that an increase in regulated bank
capital ratios affect loan spreads for non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. To test the importance of loan volume,
we use an estimator based on Khwaja and Mian (2008) & Acharya et al. (2016). Unlike Khwaja
and Mian (2008), we cannot track ﬁrm-bank relationships over time as our dataset does not
include an unique ﬁrm identiﬁer. Following Acharya et al. (2016), we aggregate loans based
on industry and probability of default class by each bank every quarter. The underlying
assumption in using this criterion is that ﬁrms in Switzerland in a speciﬁc industry and risk
category (ﬁrm-cluster) share common characteristics and were likely exposed to a common
macroeconomic environment during the sample period. Therefore our unit of observation is
bank-quarter-(ﬁrm-cluster). To control for demand over time and any common characteristics
shared by ﬁrms in the cluster, we introduce ﬁrm-cluster times quarter ﬁxed effects. To control
for bank heterogeneity and any relationships between ﬁrm-cluster and bank, we interact
ﬁrm-cluster and bank ﬁxed effects. Loan growth is the quarterly change in loan volume by
bank, i to ﬁrm-cluster, k. Our regression also includes the same bank controls as before.
10We only estimate the effect of total capital to risk-weighted asset ratio and its deviation as an explicit Tier 1
capital ratio requirement came into force in 2011Q3.
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Speciﬁcally, we estimate the following regression:
ΔLi ,k,t = β1Ki ,t−1+β2Devi ,t−1+β3Banki ,t−1+
(Firm Cluster )k ∗Time Fixed E f f ect s+
(Firm Cluster )k ∗Bank Fixed E f f ect s+i , j ,t (2.3)
2.5.4 Permanent versus temporary effect
This far our empirical speciﬁcations have estimated the short-term impact on loan spreads
and loan volume. However, it is possible that short-run effects of higher capital ratios are
different from long-run effects. For example, Bridges et al. (2014) ﬁnd a lower long-term
impact of an increase in capital requirements compared to the short-term for U.K. banks. We
do so by introducing the quarterly lagged loan growth as an explanatory variable. We estimate
the dynamic panel model in equation 2.4 using the dynamic Generalized Method of Moments
estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991).11 In this speciﬁcation, we aggregate loans
at the bank level. This enables us to have a balanced panel. The long-run effect of capital
ratio on loan growth is captured by β1/(1−γ1). Given our panel structure (N=21, T=32), we
also estimate the equation in a ﬁxed-effects framework. The presence of a lagged variable
introduces a downward bias in the estimate of γ (Nickell bias,Nickell (1981)). However, for
T>30, simulation studies have shown that this bias becomes negligible (Bruno et al. (2005),
Judson and Owen (1999)). We present results using both estimation techniques to show that
our ﬁndings are not biased by choice of estimator.
ΔLi ,t = γ1ΔLi ,t−1+β1Ki ,t−1+β2Devi ,t−1+β3Banki ,t−1+
(Firm Cluster )k ∗Time Fixed E f f ect s
+(Firm Cluster )k ∗Bank Fixed E f f ect s+i , j ,t (2.4)
2.6 Results
This section presents the results on how bank capital affects loan spread and volume. Tables
2.7 and 2.4 present the estimates for the impact of different measures of the regulated capital
ratio on loan spreads. Results from the loan growth regression are presented in Table 2.5 while
11We use difference GMM.
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Table 2.6 reports the long-run effect of higher capital to asset ratios.
2.6.1 Impact of capital ratios on loan spreads
Table 2.7 presents the estimates obtained from equation 2.1. We ﬁnd a 1 percentage point
increase in the total capital to RWA ratio is observed along with an increase in the loan spread
of 2.5 basis points. The point estimate for the tier 1 capital to RWA is slightly lower at 2.1
basis points. While the coefﬁcient on the Tier 1 leverage ratio is higher, it is not statistically
signiﬁcant. A 1 standard deviation (SD) increase in the total capital to risk-weighted ratio,
therefore, would cause a 0.07 basis point increase in loan spread which is 0.03 % of the
average loan spread in our sample. Similarly, for the Tier 1 to RWA ratio, a 1 SD increase
would also correspond to a 0.03% increase in loan spread. These estimates indicate the
economic signiﬁcance of higher capital ratio to be extremely low, if any. We ﬁnd evidence for
an asymmetric response in bank behavior with respect to whether it is below or above the
supervisory capital requirement for both the total capital and tier 1 capital ratios. The negative
sign on the dummies,Capi tal Deviation and Tier 1 Deviation indicates the banks with
capital ratios above the supervisory requirement charge a lower spread vis-a-vis a bank that is
below the required capital target. Our loan controls reveal three facts about the loan market for
non-ﬁnancial corporations in Switzerland: (i) ﬁxed maturity loans are cheaper that credit lines;
(ii) riskier ﬁrms and loans, as deﬁned by the probability of default class, are charged a higher
spread; (iii) loan spreads are positively correlated with the slope of the yield curve. Since banks
borrow at the short end and lend at the longer end of the yield curve, this correlation indicates
the cost of hedging the interest rate exposure. We also ﬁnd that larger loans are charged a
lower spread. This could be driven by the fact that larger loans are given to larger ﬁrms which
could be less risk, more proﬁtable and with an overall stronger balance sheet. Even though
we control for broad ﬁrm characteristics, our dataset does not allow us to include speciﬁc
ﬁrm level controls. Among our bank-level controls, only bank size as measured by the log of
assets is statistically signiﬁcant. The positive coefﬁcient is indicative of Swiss banks behaving
as monopolistically competitive in the corporate loan sector.
2.6.2 Asymmetric effects of capital requirements
In Table 2.4, we extend our baseline model to further account for the deviation between the
observed total capital ratio and the supervisory requirement. We ﬁnd that relative to a bank
which has a total capital to RWA asset ratio less than 2 percent below the supervisory target,
banks charge lower spreads as they move closer to the target and the reduction is larger if
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they are above. While column 1 of Table 2.4 reports the estimates for our entire sample, in
columns 2 and 3, we separately report the estimates for ﬁxed maturity loans and credit lines
respectively. We ﬁnd a quantitatively larger effect of higher capital ratio on the loan spreads
for credit lines than ﬁxed maturity loans. However, credit lines comprise only 10 percent of the
total loan volume over our sample period. Interestingly, we do not ﬁnd bank size to have any
statistically signiﬁcant impact on loan spreads for credit lines. This indicates that it is the ﬁxed
maturity loan segment where banks exhibit monopolistically competitive behavior. There are
two additional facts about the ﬁxed maturity loan segment that our estimation indicates: (i)
longer maturity loans are charged a higher spread; (ii) syndicated loans are charged a lower
spread which could be due to the positive impact of risk sharing. The effect of the other control
variables is qualitatively similar to that in Table 2.7.
2.6.3 Impact of bank capital on loan growth
In Table 2.5, we report the estimates based on the modiﬁed Khwaja and Mian (2008) estimator.
Consistent with the narrative of higher capital causing a contraction in credit supply, we ﬁnd
the coefﬁcient on capital ratios to be negative. However, now the total capital to RWA is not
statistically signiﬁcant. A 1 percentage point increase in total capital and tier 1 capital to RWA
negatively affects loan growth by 1.6 percent and 4.6 percent respectively. We also ﬁnd the
effect of having a capital ratio greater than the supervisory target to be positive on loan growth.
We also ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant impact of the tier 1 to asset ratio on loan growth. The tier
to asset ratio expunges any effects arising from a switching between assets in the same risk
category.12 Therefore the higher point estimate reﬂects a more encompassing effect of tier 1
capital. The point estimate in our baseline loan spread regression is also higher and very close
to statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level. The fact that our sample ends in 2014Q4 and that an
explicit tier 1 to asset ratio requirement was introduced only in 2011Q3 is probably why our
estimate lacks power.
2.6.4 Long-run effects of higher capital ratios
Table 2.6 we present the results for the long-run effects of higher capital ratios on loan growth.
For the rest of the independent variables, the point estimates are reported. Results obtained
by The GMM and ﬁxed estimators are reported in columns 1-3 and columns 4-6 respectively.
We do not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant long-run effect of higher capital ratios. Our ﬁnding is
12For example, if the risk-weights on German and Greek government debt are the same, a bank might increase
its holdings of Greek debt in anticipation of higher returns. However, this would not change its risk-based capital
requirement.
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consistent with the literature.
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Table 2.3. Impact of Regulatory Capital Ratios on Loan Spread
(1) (2) (3)
Loan Spread Loan Spread Loan Spread
Capital/RWA 2.508**
(2.77)
Tier 1 /RWA 2.096*
(1.87)
Tier 1/ Assets 3.093
(1.33)
Deviation Capital -0.355***
(-3.72)
Deviation Tier 1 -0.395**
(-2.22)
Credit Line Dummy -0.548** -0.548** -0.548**
(-2.44) (-2.44) (-2.44)
Log Assets 0.815*** 0.740*** 0.748***
(4.42) (4.29) (3.94)
Cash/Assets -0.460 0.100 0.0930
(-0.87) (0.14) (0.12)
Debt/Assets 0.165 0.197 0.314
(0.35) (0.43) (0.78)
Net Income/Assets 5.103 4.588 1.441
(1.12) (0.95) (0.32)
Log Loan Amount -0.166*** -0.167*** -0.167***
(-17.26) (-16.84) (-17.17)
Syndicated Loan Dummy 0.143 0.151 0.154
(1.45) (1.51) (1.53)
Spread (10Y-3M) 0.696*** 0.700*** 0.712***
(6.81) (6.95) (6.96)
PD Unknown -0.289*** -0.273*** -0.276***
(-3.29) (-3.26) (-3.27)
PD Low -0.603*** -0.601*** -0.599***
(-4.03) (-4.00) (-4.00)
PD Medium-Low -0.555*** -0.556*** -0.555***
(-3.98) (-3.98) (-4.00)
PD Medium -0.523*** -0.526*** -0.525***
(-4.31) (-4.35) (-4.35)
PD Medium-High -0.298*** -0.297*** -0.296***
(-3.14) (-3.15) (-3.16)
Time & Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 956999 956999 956999
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01 t statistics in parentheses
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Table 2.4. Asymmetric Effects of Regulatory Capital Ratios on Loan Spread
(Entire Sample) (Fixed Maturity) (Credit Lines)
Loan Spread Loan Spread Loan Spread
Capital/RWA 5.529*** 3.510*** 6.905***
(5.06) (3.40) (3.51)
I(−2,0] -0.410*** -0.257*** -0.938***
(-6.67) (-5.03) (-4.08)
I(0,2] -0.787*** -0.400*** -1.389***
(-12.27) (-4.16) (-5.05)
I(2,4] -0.725*** -0.433*** -1.232***
(-10.29) (-4.49) (-4.41)
I(4,8] -0.841*** -0.493*** -1.417***
(-8.64) (-4.30) (-4.37)
I(8,∞] -0.979*** -0.587*** -1.544***
(-8.13) (-4.41) (-4.37)
Credit Line Dummy -0.551**
(-2.45)
Log Maturity 0.243***
(18.45)
Log Assets 0.890*** 0.266** 0.851
(5.21) (2.80) (1.43)
Cash/Assets -0.646 -0.526* 1.099
(-1.65) (-1.75) (1.48)
Debt/Assets 0.122 -0.0965 -0.0591
(0.29) (-0.47) (-0.21)
Net Income/Assets 4.700 4.197*** 0.0819
(1.05) (3.17) (0.04)
Log Loan Amount -0.165*** -0.118*** -0.190***
(-17.43) (-8.11) (-9.85)
Syndicated Loan Dummy 0.131 -0.192*** 0.932
(1.36) (-2.86) (1.34)
Spread(10Y-3M) 0.708*** 0.401*** 0.995***
(6.76) (6.63) (8.67)
PD Unknown -0.296*** -0.313* -0.127
(-3.45) (-1.97) (-1.03)
PD Low -0.600*** -0.688*** -0.537***
(-4.01) (-3.92) (-3.43)
PD Medium-Low -0.555*** -0.643*** -0.467***
(-4.01) (-3.86) (-3.31)
PD Medium -0.525*** -0.564*** -0.482***
(-4.34) (-3.73) (-3.77)
PD Medium-High -0.299*** -0.320** -0.293***
(-3.15) (-2.58) (-3.11)
Time & Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 956999 579577 376822
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01 t statistics in parentheses
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Table 2.5. Impact of Regulatory Capital Ratio on Loan Growth
(1) (2) (3)
Loan Growth Loan Growth Loan Growth
Capital/RWA -1.622
(-1.44)
Tier 1/RWA -4.558***
(-3.56)
Tier 1/Assets -13.01*
(-1.93)
Deviation Capital 0.0525
(0.19)
Deviation Tier 1 0.606***
(3.36)
Log Assets 0.0152 -0.0740 -0.262
(0.07) (-0.31) (-0.91)
Cash/Assets 0.165 -0.101 -0.403
(0.12) (-0.07) (-0.26)
Debt/Assets -0.739 -0.615 -0.850
(-0.83) (-0.70) (-0.94)
Net Income/Assets 5.198 5.075 10.61
(0.64) (0.58) (1.30)
Firm Cluster*Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Cluster*Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 42448 42448 42448
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01 t statistics in parentheses. Winsor
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Table 2.6. Impact of Regulatory Capital Ratio on All In Drawn Spread
(GMM - Arellano Bond) (Fixed Effects)
Loan Growth Loan Growth Loan Growth Loan Growth Loan Growth Loan Growth
Lagged Loan Growth -0.0495*** -0.0488*** -0.0504*** -0.0367 -0.0365 -0.0363
(-6.06) (-6.18) (-6.28) (-0.88) (-0.88) (-0.88)
Long-run coefﬁcients, β/(1−γ)
Capital/RWA -4.465 -3.669
(-1.21) (-1.43)
Tier 1/RWA -5.148 -4.775
(-1.28) (-1.50)
Tier1/Assets -15.014 -6.360
(-1.04) (-1.00)
Deviation - Total Capital 0.312 0.234
(1.18) (1.24)
Deviation - Tier 1 0.769** 0.533*
(2.04) (1.74)
Log Assets -0.841 -0.802 -0.944 -0.383 -0.369 -0.264
(-1.27) (-1.44) (-1.29) (-1.16) (-1.17) (-1.02)
Cash/Assets 1.064 0.614 0.206 0.249 0.0324 -0.145
(0.84) (0.53) (0.27) (0.27) (0.04) (-0.17)
Debt/Assets -0.787 -0.751 -0.982 -0.679 -0.686 -0.777
(-0.90) (-0.88) (-1.06) (-1.04) (-1.04) (-1.15)
Net Income/Assets -11.58 -11.47 -9.660 -1.940 -0.976 0.426
(-0.45) (-0.46) (-0.37) (-0.17) (-0.09) (0.04)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effects Not Applicable* Yes Yes Yes
N 613 613 613 634 634 634
∗p < 0.1,∗∗p < 0.05,∗∗∗p < 0.01 t statistics in parentheses
Difference GMM
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2.7 Robustness Tests
2.7.1 Effect of Risk-Weighted Asset Density
RWAs decreased during our sample period as shown in Figure 2.8. A decrease in the RWA
density implies that a bank is holding more assets with a lower risk-weight. This asset portfolio
choice can lead to an increase in cost of loans to ﬁrms if banks choose to pass on the cost of
higher capital required against these loans vis-a-vis safer assets. Alternatively, if a lowering in
the RWA density makes a bank safer and lowers the overall borrowing cost, it can choose to
charge lower rates on loans to ﬁrms. We test for the effect of RWA density by adding it as an
explanatory variable in our baseline speciﬁcation outlined in equation 2.1 along with the Tier1
to asset ratio as the main explanatory variable. The results tabulated in Table ??. We ﬁnd the
effect of RWA density to be negative and signiﬁcant. This indicates that banks with a lower
RWA density charge a higher spread for lending to ﬁrms.
2.7.2 Annual data
It is possible that decisions regarding loan portfolios and capital plans are made by a bank
at a frequency lower than the quarterly level. Also, some of our bank variables are reported
bi-annually. Therefore, we re-estimate equation 2.7 to test for the impact of capital ratios
on loan spreads using annual data. The results are reported in Table 2.8. The estimates are
qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 2.7. Quantitatively, our point estimates for the
regulatory capital ratios are larger. In Beutler and Wunderli (2016 forthcoming)), results from
the Swiss Bank Lending Survey suggest that the operational implementation of credit granting
reacts fairly quickly (quarter-on-quarter), while the guidelines from the strategic level of the
bank react somewhat lagged (year-on-year). Additionally, they ﬁnd that banks reacts most
strongly after about three to four quarters, while the reaction on a quarter-by-quarter level is
less strong. Therefore, we believe this to be a structural feature of the Swiss banking industry
and it lends credence to our hypothesis of lower frequency optimization of capital and loan
portfolio.
2.7.3 Capital growth on loan growth
In section 2.6.3, we presented results on how the level of the capital ratios impact loan growth.
This was a slight departure from the empirical model in Khwaja and Mian (2008) which uses
growth in the dependent variable as a regressor. We modify our empirical speciﬁcation to
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Table 2.7. Effect of Risk-Weighted Asset Density on Loan Spread
(1)
Loan Spread
Tier 1/ Assets 3.915
(1.59)
RWA/Assets -0.730**
(0.34)
Credit Line Dummy -0.549**
(-2.44)
Log Assets 0.712***
(3.90)
Cash/Assets -0.174
(-0.24)
Debt/Assets 0.328
(0.38)
Net Income/Assets -0.336
(-0.08)
Log Loan Amount -0.166***
(-16.89)
Syndicated Loan Dummy 0.143
(1.42)
Spread (10Y-3M) 0.713***
(6.90)
PD Unknown -0.283***
(-3.27)
PD Low -0.600***
(-4.04)
PD Medium-Low -0.555***
(-4.01)
PD Medium -0.525***
(-4.36)
PD Medium-High -0.296***
(-3.14)
Time & Bank Fixed Effects Yes
N 956999
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01 t statistics in parentheses
estimate the impact of capital growth on loan growth in equation 2.5. ΔKt−1 and ΔRWAt−1
are the quarterly growth in capital and risk-weighted assets respectively. The results tabulated
in Table 2.9. Even though the point estimates have the expected signs, we do not ﬁnd a
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statistically signiﬁcant impact of the growth in capital on loan growth.
ΔLi ,k,t = β1ΔKi ,t−1+β2ΔRWAi ,t−1+β3Banki ,t−1+Banki +Timet +i , j ,t (2.5)
2.7.4 Loan Growth - 2009Q1 onwards
In section 2.4, we show an increase in new credit granted between 2008Q3 and 2008Q4. To
alleviate concerns that out loan growth regression results presented in Table 2.5 are driven by
this, we re-estimate equation 2.3 for our sample starting 2009Q1. The results are presented in
Table 2.10. As before, we ﬁnd the coefﬁcient on capital ratios to be negative. Only the Tier 1
to risk-weighted asset ratio is now statistically signiﬁcant. We do not have a dummy for the
deviation in Tier 1 capital to RWA ratio as there are only positive deviations starting 2009Q1.
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Table 2.8. Impact of Regulatory Capital Ratios on Loan Spread - Annual
(1) (2) (3)
Loan Spread Loan Spread Loan Spread
Capital/RWA 4.119***
(4.05)
Tier 1/RWA 3.898**
(2.39)
Tier 1/Assets 15.53
(1.67)
Deviation Capital -0.138**
(-2.43)
Deviation Tier 1 -0.124***
(-4.86)
Credit Line Dummy -0.587** -0.585** -0.581**
(-2.52) (-2.50) (-2.46)
Log Assets 1.081*** 1.057*** 1.213***
(4.66) (4.18) (3.02)
Cash/Assets 0.537 1.081 1.809
(0.56) (0.98) (1.25)
Debt/Assets 1.280 1.471* 1.581*
(1.51) (1.77) (2.09)
Net Income/Assets 5.098 3.704 5.754
(0.64) (0.53) (0.76)
Log Loan Amount -0.163*** -0.163*** -0.164***
(-16.23) (-15.94) (-15.97)
Syndicated Loan Dummy 0.0934 0.109 0.123
(1.07) (1.21) (1.35)
Spread(10Y-3M) 1.592*** 1.581*** 1.499**
(4.89) (3.84) (2.78)
PD Unknown -0.270*** -0.257*** -0.232***
(-3.39) (-3.27) (-3.09)
PD Low -0.586*** -0.591*** -0.580***
(-3.95) (-3.97) (-3.83)
PD Medium-Low -0.543*** -0.545*** -0.541***
(-3.93) (-3.91) (-3.91)
PD Medium -0.510*** -0.514*** -0.511***
(-4.26) (-4.29) (-4.27)
PD Medium-High -0.290*** -0.291*** -0.292***
(-3.15) (-3.14) (-3.17)
Time & Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 917980 917980 917980
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01 t statistics in parentheses
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Table 2.9. Impact of capital growth on loan growth
(1) (2)
Loan Growth Loan Growth
Capital Growth -0.0778
(-0.25)
Tier 1 Growth -0.154
(-0.54)
RWA Growth 0.877 0.973
(1.01) (1.17)
Deviation Capital -1.270
(-1.07)
Deviation Tier 1 0.460**
(2.21)
Log Assets 0.0533 0.154
(0.24) (0.63)
Cash/Assets 0.409 0.243
(0.32) (0.18)
Debt/Assets -0.913 -0.856
(-0.95) (-0.93)
Net Income / Assets 3.938 -7.473
(0.43) (-0.58)
Firm-Cluster*Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Firm-Cluster*Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 42448 42448
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01 t statistics in parentheses
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Table 2.10. Impact of Regulatory Capital Ratio on Loan Growth - 2009Q1 onwards
(1) (2) (3)
Loan Growth Loan Growth Loan Growth
Capital/RWA -1.450
(-0.78)
Tier 1/RWA -3.300*
(-1.94)
Tier 1/Assets -11.198
(-1.25)
Deviation Capital -0.447
(-0.81)
Log Assets -0.521 -0.619 -0.784
(-1.20) (-1.58) (-1.71)
Cash/Assets 0.921 1.018 0.532
(0.66) (0.71) (0.35)
Debt/Assets -1.352* -1.189** -1.176**
(-2.85) (-2.16) (-2.18)
Net Income/Assets 5.198 8.292 10.01
(0.64) (0.36) (0.43)
Firm Cluster*Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Cluster*Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 30958 30958 30958
∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01 t statistics in parentheses. Winsor
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2.8 Conclusions
In this paper, we estimated the impact of higher capital ratios for banks in Switzerland on
pricing and volume of loans to non-ﬁnancial corporations. Using a conﬁdential dataset on
new credit granted matched with supervisory data on bank balance sheets, we ﬁnd a small
but statistically signiﬁcant impact of higher capital ratios on both pricing and volume (in
the usual sense of everything else being equal). Additionally, our analysis indicates that
banks’ response varies by size and deviation from the supervisory target. Our estimate of the
statistically insigniﬁcant long-run effect supports the Basel Committee’s recommendation on
longer phase-in periods for banks to attain higher capital ratio targets.
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2.A Appendix: Sample Loan Types
Table 2.11. Loan Type
N Frequency Frequency
Variable entire sample entire sample Cumulative Up-to 2008q4
Mortgages to Firms 448,414 46.86 46.69 47.08
Investment Credit 264,552 27.64 74.46 19.06
Overdraft Facility 200,758 20.98 95.45 29.04
Construction Loans 21,353 2.23 97.67 3.23
Fixed Advance 9,338 0.98 98.67 0.59
Investment Loans 4,926 0.51 99.19 0.73
Miscellaneous Loans 4,269 0.45 99.63 0.04
Rollover Credit 1,753 0.18 99.83 0.10
Baufesthypothek 847 0.09 99.92 0.01
Seasonal Credit 789 0.08 100 0.12
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2.B Appendix: Sample Firm Size Distribution
Table 2.12. Firm Size Distribution
Firm Size N
CHF Million entire sample
<1 487,115
1-5 155,497
6-25 131,936
26-100 85,750
>100 33,166
Unspeciﬁed 98,072
2.C Appendix: Sample PD Class Distribution
Table 2.13. Probability of Default Class Distribution
Firm Size N
CHF Million entire sample
1 28,045
2 48,788
3 214,536
4 440,483
5 148,391
Unspeciﬁed 111,293
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3 Leverage & Use of Financing: Corpo-
rate America after the Great Reces-
sion
3.1 Introduction
After the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis, central banks around the world have pursued both
standard and unconventional monetary policy actions in an attempt to stimulate economic
activity. While the interactions between monetary policy and real outcomes have been widely
researched, there is relatively less evidence on the impact of post-crisis monetary policy
measures on ﬁrm level outcomes. Given the scale of measures undertaken, it is important to
understand the impact on ﬁrm behavior.
In this paper, I empirically investigate changes in ﬁrm behavior along the dimensions of
investment, payout to equity holders and cash holdings in the aftermath of the great recession.
With the short-term nominal rate constrained by the zero lower bound, the Federal Reserve
(Fed) implemented a number of asset purchase programs with the stated objective of lowering
long-term interest rates and yields across different asset classes.1 A number of empirical
studies show that the Fed was successful in this objective.2
I begin the analyses by documenting an increase in the real value of debt on the balance
sheet of U.S. non-ﬁnancial corporates and that this increase has been driven by long-term
debt. I next investigate the relationship between long-term debt and investment and whether
this has changed after the crisis using ﬁxed effects panel regressions. Further, I use the Whited-
Wu index (Whited and Wu (2006)) as a measure of ﬁnancial constraints to test for changes
1http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120831a.htm
2See Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Swanson (2011), Meaning and Zhu (2011)
77
Chapter 3. Leverage & Use of Financing: Corporate America after the Great Recession
in the investment behavior of constrained vis-a-vis unconstrained ﬁrms post-crisis. I ﬁnd a
negative correlation between investment as a share of total assets and the ratio of long-term
debt to assets. This effect is stronger quantitatively and statistically signiﬁcant post-crisis.
Interestingly, I also ﬁnd that an unconstrained ﬁrm, as deﬁned by the Whited-Wu index, has
lower investment post-crisis vis-a-vis pre-crisis. In the next set of tests, I evaluate alternate
uses of debt namely, payouts to equity holders and cash holdings. I ﬁnd that after the crisis, a
higher long-term debt to asset ratio is positively correlated with payouts and negatively with
the growth in cash holdings. Additionally, the likelihood of net share repurchases increases
with the share of long-term debt post-crisis.
The analysis provides new evidence on ﬁrm behavior post-crisis. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper to analyze post-crisis ﬁrm behavior over an extended time
period. It also adds to the debate on the effects of monetary policy actions pursued in the
wake of the recent ﬁnancial crisis. There have been concerns that these policies would have
negligible real effects and might even lead to excessive risk taking and distort investment
decisions.3,4
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 discusses related literature. Section 3.3
describes the data. Section 3.4 provides descriptive evidence and the basic hypotheses. Section
3.5 presents the econometric model and results. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
There are a few studies that evaluate the impact on ﬁrm outcomes in the wake of the recent
crisis. Duchin et al. (2010) use the ﬁnancial crisis as a negative shock to ﬁnancing constraints
and ﬁnd a signiﬁcant decline in ﬁrm investment with larger effects for ﬁrms with low cash
holdings or high short-term debt. Using a survey based measure of ﬁnancial constraints,
Campello et al. (2010) ﬁnd that Chief Financial Ofﬁcers of constrained ﬁrms drew down
on lines of credit, postponed proﬁtable projects, and reduced investment and employment.
Bliss et al. (2015) argue for the ﬁnancial crisis to be a shock to the net supply of credit and
show that ﬁrms reduced payouts to maintain cash levels and fund investment. Using debt
maturity as an identiﬁcation strategy, Almeida et al. (2009) show that ﬁrms with long-term
debt maturing just after 2007Q3 cut investment more than similar ﬁrms with debt maturing
after 2008. These studies, however, provide evidence on ﬁrm behavior using the crisis as a
negative shock to credit supply. Foley-Fisher et al. (2016) ﬁnd that the maturity extension
3https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/stein20130207a.htm
4http://www.bis.org/events/agm2013/sp130623.htm
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program (MEP5) helped relax ﬁnancing constraints for ﬁrms with a higher historical long-term
debt dependence (Long-term debt/total debt). Further they show that these ﬁrms had a higher
growth of property, plant and equipment (PP&E) and employees in 2012, the year of MEP. I
ﬁnd the opposite effect on PP&E growth using quarterly data.
This study is related to the classical corporate ﬁnance research thread on the impact of
ﬁnancial constraints and supply of capital on investment (Fazzari et al. (1988) & Kaplan and
Zingales (1997)). This work is also related to studies that expostulate the relationship between
corporate ﬁnancing and macroeconomic conditions. Broadly, these can be divided into two
groups. The ﬁrst focuses on the demand for capital as a function of ﬁrm characteristics. If
agency problems and asymmetric information are the main determinants for the demand
of capital, improved macroeconomic conditions should be positively correlated with equity
issuances while periods of economic contractions should induce a shift towards less informa-
tion sensitive sources of ﬁnancing. Choe et al. (1993) and Bolton and Freixas (2000) exposit
these demand based models. However, Baker (2009) points out, the time series of capital
structure decisions, payout policy, and investment are not very well explained by the demand
based theories. A supply driven mechanism is postulated by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)
where a ﬁnancial crisis leads to a tightening in credit supply for ﬁrms. Poor macroeconomic
conditions can also lead to episodes of ’ﬂight to quality’ where investors have a preference for
high quality information insensitive securities. Empirically, Kashyap et al. (1993) show that
ﬁrms, in response to higher interest rates, switch to commercial paper from bank loans. Erel et
al. (2012) provide evidence for macroeconomic conditions inﬂuencing both choice of capital
structure and a ﬁrms’ ability to raise capital subject to ﬁrm quality.
Additionally, this work is related to the theories of capital structure. There are three that
are broadly prevalent.6 The ﬁrst is the trade-off theory, according to which managers weigh the
beneﬁts of debt against the costs of bankruptcy. The key idea is that since debt requires repay-
ment, it mitigates the agency problem of free cash ﬂows (Jensen (1986)). Additionally, a ﬁrm
following the trade-off theory targets a debt-to-value ratio with continual adjustments(Myers
(1984)). The second is the pecking order theory. Based on the problem of adverse selection, it
orders a ﬁrms’ sources of funding as retained earnings, debt, and equity (Myers and Majluf
(1984)). The third is the market timing theory. As per this, managers choose between debt and
equity ﬁnance based on market conditions. They issue equity when equity prices are high and
issue debt when yields are low. Baker and Wurgler (2002) argue that cumulative effect of past
5Also known as Operation Twist. Under this program, the Fed used the proceeds from selling or redeeming $667
billion of shorter-term Treasury securities to buy longer-term Treasury securities.
6For a review on the theories of capital structure, see Frank and Goyal (2011)
79
Chapter 3. Leverage & Use of Financing: Corporate America after the Great Recession
market timing is the best determinant of capital structure. Also, Graham and Harvey (2001),
in a survey of 392 Chief Financial Ofﬁcers ﬁnd evidence in support of this hypothesis. The
descriptive evidence in this paper is indicative of the market timing theory.
3.3 Data
I use quarterly data from CRSP/Compustat Merged (CCM) Fundamentals for 1990Q1-2015Q4.7
Since the study focuses on U.S. ﬁrms, all ﬁrms with a foreign incorporation code are excluded.
The sample excludes ﬁnancial ﬁrms and utilities (Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation(SIC) 4900-
4949 and 6000-6999). All observations with missing assets are dropped. Variable deﬁnitions
are provided in Appendix 3.A. Data on the federal funds rate (FFR), corporate bond yields,
and gross domestic product (GDP) is obtained from the FRED database made available by the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
3.4 Descriptive Evidence & Basic hypotheses
In response to the recent ﬁnancial crisis, by december 2008, the Federal Reserve lowered it’s
target short term interest rate to 0-25 basis points. The FFR is the primary interest rate in
the U.S. ﬁnancial market. It impacts interest rates on savings, loans, and mortgages. With
GDP growth and employment numbers weak, the Fed embarked on a series of Quantitative
Easing (QE) programs. QE was aimed at lowering long-term borrowing costs and improve
credit availability for households and ﬁrms. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011)
evaluate the impact of Federal Reserve’s QE1 and QE2 on interest rates and ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
impact for Treasuries, Agency bonds , and highly-rated corporate bonds. Swanson (2011) also
ﬁnds a lowering of treasury and corporate bond yield as a consequence of QE2. While theses
studies evaluate the immediate impact, Cahill et al. (2013) show a longer-term effect of the
various asset purchase programs on treasury yields. Figure 3.1 plots the effective FFR and
yields for corporate bonds rated AAA and Baa. It is evident from the ﬁgure that corporate
bond yields are below the levels observed prior to the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Barry et al. (2008)
present evidence that ﬁrms have a higher debt issuance when the level of interest rate is lower
compared to historical values. Graham and Harvey (2001) provide survey based evidence that
chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcers attempt to time the market by issuing debt when interest rates are low.
In Figure 3.2, I document the evolution of real balance sheet debt and the ratio of balance
sheet debt to GDP for U.S. corporates excluding ﬁnancials and utilities. The ﬁgure reveals an
7Following the adoption of the statement of Financial Accounting Standard 95, 1989 was the ﬁrst year for the
standardized statement of cash ﬂows.
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Figure 3.1. Effective Federal Funds Rate and Baa-AAA Corporate bond spread
increase in debt leading up to 2001 recession followed by a modest decline. However between
2010Q2 and 2015Q4, it has increased by 51 percent from USD 2.47 trillion to USD 3.73 trillion.
While the debt to GDP ratio of non-ﬁnancial corporates declined after the 2001 recession,
it has sharply increased since 2010. The increase in balance sheet debt is mirrored in the
increase in book leverage (Figure 3.3), deﬁned as total book value of debt divided by the book
value of assets, which has increased from a post-crisis low of 25 percent to 33 percent. The
spike in leverage during the ﬁnancial crisis is mostly due to a fall in assets. It is possible that
the observed increase in aggregate leverage is driven by larger ﬁrms. The trade-off theory of
capital structure, according to which ﬁrms weigh the cost of default against the tax beneﬁts
of debt, predicts larger ﬁrms to have higher leverage. In Figure 3.4, I split the sample into six
size groups by percentiles based on total assets. While ﬁrms in the larger percentiles have
higher leverage, there has been an increase in leverage for each size group. Next, in Figure 3.5,
I document that the net issuance of long-term debt has closely tracked total debt issuance.
Given that ﬁrms have increased their debt holdings, it is important to understand how these
funds are being put to use. If higher debt issuance was to ﬁnance new projects, one would
expect to observe an increase in capital investment. Panel A of Figure 3.6 plots the ratio of
new capital expenditures as a share of assets and panel B, the growth in property, plant, and
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Figure 3.2. Real Balance Sheet Debt
Figure 3.3. Book Leverage
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Figure 3.4. Book Leverage (Size Percentiles)
Figure 3.5. Net Debt Issuance: Total and Long-term
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equipment (PP&E)8. After a sharp fall during the recent ﬁnancial crisis, aggregate evidence
indicates that both measures have recovered to pre-crisis levels. In the empirical speciﬁcation,
I test for the impact of a higher long-term debt to asset ratio on these two measures of capital
spending. Further, if low corporate bond yields improved the ability of ﬁrms to issue debt,
it can be thought of as a relaxation in the external ﬁnancing constraint. In the cross-section,
unconstrained ﬁrms should invest more vis-a-vis constrained ﬁrms. I use the Whited-Wu index
to separate ﬁrms into two groups - constrained and unconstrained and test if this hypothesis
holds true post-crisis.
Alternatively, it is possible that ﬁrms could have put the borrowed funds to alternate use. This
Figure 3.6. Capital Expenditures and Growth in PP&E
could be the case if the post-crisis recovery was sluggish or there was continued macroeco-
nomic uncertainty. I explore two different uses of ﬁnancing in this paper; (1) Payouts to equity
holders and (2) Increase in cash holdings. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to take a
stand on the post-crisis recovery and macroeconomic environment, the extant literature has
explored reasons for ﬁrms wanting to increase cash holdings and/or postpone investment.
Bates et al. (2009) provide evidence of an increase in cash holdings for ﬁrms with riskier cash
ﬂows. Firms have an incentive to buyback their stock if it is optimal to postpone capital
8Since the quarterly capital expenditure series is extremely volatile, for the purpose of exposition, the ﬁgure
plots annual capital expenditures. PP&E growth is plotted quarter on quarter.
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expenditures as in the presence of uncertainty Bloom (2009). Panel A of Figure 3.7 presents
the evolution of cash and short-term investments as a share of total assets in the aggregate.
The sharpest increase is observed after the dot-com bubble when this share increased from
7 percent to about 11.5 percent. While this ratio did go up during the great recession, it has
remained relatively stable at the same level since. In panel B, I document a steady increase
in payout to equity holders in the form of dividends and equity repurchases leading up to
the great recession. It collapses during the crisis but has now surpassed it’s pre-crisis peak.
I further break down payouts into dividend payments and equity repurchases in Figure 3.8.
Payouts in the form of dividends and equity repurchases sharply increase between 2004 and
2008. During the crisis, however, equity repurchases show a sharp decrease while dividends
remain stable. Post-crisis, we again observe a sharp increase in both. Table 3.1 further doc-
uments the increase in the percentage of ﬁrms paying dividends and repurchasing shares
after the ﬁnancial crisis. In 2007, 25.57% and 25.56% of sample ﬁrms paid out dividends and
re-purchased shares respectively. This share increased to 32.3% and 34.6% respectively in 2015.
Additionally, net share repurchases have closely tracked net long-term debt issuance by U.S.
non-ﬁnancial corporates after the ﬁnancial crisis (Figure 3.9). This last stylized fact has also
been documented by Van (2015). It is important to distinguish between the two payout policies
as it might inﬂuence real outcomes. Almeida et al. (2016) show that repurchases motivated by
earnings per share (EPS) are associated with reductions in investment and employment. On
the other hand, Brav et al. (2005) report that dividend payments are sticky and a sustainable
increase in earnings or demand from institutional investors are the main reasons for initiating
or increasing dividend payments. Therefore dividend payouts are less likely to funded by debt
issuance than share repurchases. The ﬁnal empirical test estimates the relationship between
the long-term debt to asset ratio and the likelihood of net share repurchases and dividend
payments.
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Figure 3.7. Aggregate time-series of cash & short-term investments to asset ratio and the
payout to equity holders.
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Figure 3.8. Aggregate time-series behavior of dividend payments and share repurchases.
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Table 3.1. Percentage of Firms paying dividends and repurchasing shares
Year Dividend Share
Payers(%) Repurchasers(%)
1990 28.65 26.73
1991 27.06 16.49
1992 26.48 16.68
1993 25.27 16.60
1994 23.64 17.42
1995 23.18 18.14
1996 21.47 20.17
1997 19.99 20.25
1998 19.52 24.64
1999 19.28 27.14
2000 17.68 25.56
2001 17.33 21.08
2002 17.87 20.66
2003 20.50 18.87
2004 23.18 18.65
2005 24.84 21.56
2006 25.53 23.79
2007 25.57 26.56
2008 25.60 30.00
2009 24.24 21.45
2010 25.68 24.43
2011 28.02 30.72
2012 31.26 30.91
2013 31.76 30.44
2014 32.50 32.87
2015 32.30 34.60
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Figure 3.9. Net long-term debt issuance and Net share repurchases
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3.5 Econometric Model and Results
3.5.1 Impact of Long term debt on corporate investment
I estimate the following equation using the ﬁxed effects framework to determine the impact
on investment. The speciﬁcation is based on Covas and Den Haan (2011). In equation 3.1,
I evaluate the impact of long-term debt to asset ratio on investment. Investment is capital
expenditures at time, t scaled by total ﬁrm assets (TA) at time, t-1 or the growth in PP&E
between t and t-1. Post-crisis is a dummy variable that takes a value equal to one starting
2009Q1.9
Investmenti ,t = β0+β1(LTDi ,t−1/ TAi ,t−2)+β2(Cashi ,t−1/ TAi ,t−2)+
β3(Salesi ,t−1/ TAi ,t−2)+β4(Tobin′s q)i ,t−1+
β5(Net Incomei ,t−1/ TAi ,t−2)+β6(Market Leverage)i ,t−1+
β7(Log TA)i ,t−2+β8Post Cr i si s ∗ (LTDi ,t−1/ TAi ,t−2)+
β9Post Cr i si s ∗ (Cashi ,t−1/ TAi ,t−2)+
β10Post Cr i si s ∗ (Salesi ,t−1/ TAi ,t−2)+
β11Post Cr i si s ∗ (Tobin′s q)i ,t−1/+
β12Post Cr i si s ∗ (Net Incomei ,t−1/ TAi ,t−2)+
β13Post Cr i si s ∗ (Market Leverage)i ,t−1+
Firm Fixed E f f ect s+Time Fixed E f f ect s+σi j t (3.1)
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.2 report the results. The primary coefﬁcients of interest are
the ones on ratio of long-term debt to assets and the interaction with the post-crisis dummy, PC.
Both the coefﬁcient on the long-term debt ratio and the interaction term are negative. In the
previous section, I documented the increase in long-term debt holdings of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms
post-crisis. The results indicate that a higher share of long-term debt has a negative impact
on both capital expenditures and PP&E growth and that this relationship has been reinforced
post-crisis. A one standard deviation higher long-tern debt to asset ratio is associated with a
0.02% and 0.07% lower capital expenditures as a share of assets and PP&E growth respectively.
The additional effects post crisis are 0.03% and 0.3% respectively. This negative impact of
the long-term debt ratio on investment is consistent with the past literature on leverage and
9Results are qualitatively and statistically similar if I chose a later date for switching on the post crisis dummy,
for e.g. 2010Q2
90
3.5 Econometric Model and Results
capital investment(Lang et al. (1996) and Ahn et al. (2006)). In addition, I ﬁnd a statistically
signiﬁcant difference in how ﬁrm characteristics inﬂuence investment behavior after the crisis.
I expect ﬁrms with higher liquidity (cash to asset ratio), investment opportunities (Tobin’s Q)
and proﬁtability (Net Income to Assets) to invest more. Importantly, I ﬁnd the effects to be
opposite or insigniﬁcant post-crisis. The ﬁndings suggest a signiﬁcant post-crisis departure
from established ﬁrm behavior. The ratio of cash to total assets is statistically insigniﬁcant
for capital expenditures. In the cross-section, it is positively correlated with PP&E growth.
However, the post-crisis effect is negative. The positive coefﬁcient is in line with Riddick and
Whited (2009) who argue that ﬁrms with higher cash ratios invest more. A possible explanation
for the change in sign is that cash ﬂows after the ﬁnancial crisis have become riskier leading to
an increase in cash ratios and lower investment which would corroborate ﬁndings in Bates et
al. (2009). Also of interest is the reversal in the relationship between Tobin’s Q and investment.
This could potentially indicate a divergence between investors’ and a ﬁrms’ own perception of
growth opportunities. This would be true if the post-crisis increase in market value of ﬁrms has
been driven by investors searching for higher returns in a low yield environment as opposed
to higher expected ﬁrm growth. The sign on market leverage follows the same logic as that of
Tobin’s Q. A higher market value lowers market leverage and vice-versa. The observed change
in sign post-crisis for most of the control variables could be driven by the fact that investment
can be thought of as a proxy for growth opportunities. If ﬁrms expect lower or uncertain future
demand then it is optimal for ﬁrms to postpone investment as modeled by Bloom (2009).
The analysis documents lower yields and an increase in long-term debt and book
leverage but does not provide an insight into whether or not the higher debt issuance helped
relax ﬁrm ﬁnancing constraints. If ﬁnancial constraints were indeed relaxed, one would expect
unconstrained ﬁrms to invest more that their constrained counterparts. To test this, I use the
Whited-Wu index 10 as a measure of ﬁnancial constraints. Unconstr ained is an indicator
variable equal to one if the ﬁrm is less constrained than the median ﬁrm for that quarter.
Additionally, I interact it with the post-crisis dummy, PC. The results are reported in columns 3
and 4 of Table 3.2. While an unconstrained ﬁrm has higher capital expenditure and growth in
PP&E in the cross-section, the effects are reversed post-crisis. The control variables exhibit the
same behavior as in columns 1 and 2. Overall, the results outlined in Table 3.2 do not indicate
any positive effects post-crisis on investment due to an increase in long-term debt. In the
following section, I analyze alternate uses of funds by ﬁrms.
10−0.091CFi ,t −0.062DIV POSi ,t +0.021TLTDi ,t −0.044LNTAi ,t +0.102ISGi ,t −0.035SGi ,t
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Table 3.2. Long-term debt and Firm investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital Expenditures PP&E Growth Capital Expenditures PP&E Growth
LTD/TA -0.00119** -0.00595** -0.00157*** -0.0120***
(-2.23) (-1.99) (-3.11) (-4.29)
PC*LTD/TA -0.00162* -0.0257***
(-1.83) (-5.80)
Unconstrained 0.00145*** 0.0174***
(8.18) (14.79)
PC*Unconstrained -0.000971*** -0.00425***
(-3.43) (-2.82)
Cash/TA 0.0000707 0.118*** 0.0000816 0.117***
(0.16) (33.06) (0.18) (32.63)
Sales/TA 0.00682*** 0.0309*** 0.00679*** 0.0304***
(11.61) (8.20) (11.54) (8.07)
Tobin’s Q 0.00181*** 0.0145*** 0.00179*** 0.0143***
(30.16) (33.65) (29.93) (33.16)
Net Income/TA 0.0116*** 0.208*** 0.0113*** 0.206***
(11.45) (24.69) (11.13) (24.45)
Market Leverage -0.00141*** -0.00868*** -0.00139*** -0.00831***
(-27.97) (-30.24) (-27.97) (-29.40)
Log Assets -0.0000997 0.00414*** -0.000291** 0.00149*
(-0.77) (5.45) (-2.23) (1.92)
PC*Cash/TA -0.000184 -0.0314*** -0.000386 -0.0278***
(-0.30) (-6.04) (-0.61) (-5.37)
PC*Sales/TA -0.00131 -0.0122*** -0.00120 -0.00792*
(-1.59) (-2.87) (-1.44) (-1.89)
PC*Tobin’s Q -0.000632*** -0.000628 -0.000620*** -0.000882
(-5.94) (-0.77) (-5.82) (-1.07)
PC*Net Income/TA -0.00436** -0.0198 -0.00267 -0.0141
(-2.27) (-1.19) (-1.40) (-0.84)
PC*Market Leverage 0.000248*** 0.00255*** 0.000209** 0.00154***
(2.59) (5.28) (2.28) (3.43)
Firm & Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 345779 344792 345779 344792
adj. R2 0.464 0.148 0.464 0.149
This table reports ﬁxed effect regressions for the period 1990Q1-2015Q4. Variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent.
Errors are clustered by ﬁrm.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level
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3.5.2 Use of ﬁnancing
To examine the relationship between long-term debt and payout to equity holders or the
growth in cash holdings, I estimate equation 3.2. Use of ﬁnancing at time, t, is the logarithm of
the real total payout to equity holders or the growth in cash holdings between t and t-1.
Use o f f inancingi ,t = β0+β1(LTD/ TA)i ,t−1++β2(Sales/ TAi ,t−1)+
β3(Tobin
′s q)i ,t−1+β4(Net Income/ TA)i ,t−1+
β5(Market Leverage)i ,t−1+β6(Log Asset s)i ,t−1+
β7Post Cr i si s ∗ (LTD/ TA)i ,t−1+
β8Post Cr i si s ∗ (Sales/ TA)i ,t−1+
β9Post Cr i si s ∗ (Tobin′s q)i ,t−1+
β10Post Cr i si s ∗ (Net Income/ TA)i ,t−1+
β11Post Cr i si s ∗ (Market Leverage)i ,t−1+
Firm Fixed E f f ect s+Time Fixed E f f ect s+σi j t (3.2)
Table 3.3 reports the estimates from the speciﬁcation outlined above. Column 1 shows that
the relationship between long-term debt to asset ratio and payouts has reversed post-crisis.
Firm life-cycle theory(DeAngelo et al. (2006)) suggests that payouts should be ﬁnanced via
excess free cash ﬂow. Therefore, a positive correlation between the long-term debt ratio and
payouts is not explicitly supported by a theoretical framework. One likely explanation for a
debt-ﬁnanced payout is the managerial desire to meet earnings per share forecasts. Hribar et
al. (2006) show that a majority of share repurchases between 1988 and 2001 were carried out
by ﬁrms that would have missed analyst EPS forecasts. In the next section, I separate dividend
payments and net share repurchases and test whether a higher share of long-term debt has a
differing impact on the probability of the two forms of payout.
The increase in cash holdings by U.S. non-ﬁnancial corporates for the pre-crisis sample
period has been well documented elsewhere (Dittmar (2008) and Bates et al. (2009)). This
is reﬂected in the positive cross-sectional correlation between the growth in cash holdings
and the long-term debt ratio. However, the negative sign on the post-crisis interaction term
indicates that the ﬁrms have lowered their cash growth even as they increased the long-term
debt ratio after the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Taken together, the results indicate that ﬁrms
have utilized new borrowings to manage their capital structure as opposed to investment or
increasing cash holdings.
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Table 3.3. Use of ﬁnancing - payouts vs. cash
(1) (2)
Log(Real Payout) Cash Growth
LTD/TA -1.263*** 0.167***
(-14.28) (6.91)
PC*LTD/TA 0.459*** -0.134***
(3.42) (-4.19)
Sales/TA 0.0435 0.542***
(0.47) (15.97)
Tobin’s Q 0.119*** 0.0437***
(9.72) (18.07)
Net income/TA 1.510*** -0.367***
(6.05) (-6.39)
Market Leverage -0.192*** 0.00989***
(-14.82) (3.78)
Log Assets 0.913*** -0.0514***
(41.21) (-11.89)
PC*Sales/TA -0.0118 -0.139***
(-0.09) (-4.15)
PC*Tobin’s Q 0.140*** 0.0105***
(6.83) (2.68)
PC*Net Income/TA 1.903*** -0.0155
(3.82) (-0.16)
PC*Market Leverage -0.105*** -0.00655
(-3.67) (-1.45)
Firm & Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 138671 353530
adj. R2 0.764 0.033
This table reports ﬁxed effect regressions for the period 1990Q1-2015Q4. Variables are
winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. Errors are clustered by ﬁrm.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level
3.5.3 Long-term debt and the likelihood of payouts
In the following estimation, I separately examine the relationship between the long-term debt
to asset ratio and the likelihood of dividend payments or share repurchases. The empirical
speciﬁcation is similar to equation 3.2. The dependent variable, however, is now a dummy
variable that takes a value of one if a ﬁrm has a positive dollar amount of dividend payments or
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net share repurchases . Because, a ﬁrm with a positive dividend payment in one quarter shows
a high propensity towards a positive dividend payment in the next11, I estimate the model
with both random and ﬁxed effects.12 Both the Lagrangian Multiplier13 and the Hausman
speciﬁcation tests14 reject the null of individual effects being insigniﬁcant at the 1% level. The
results are reported in Table 3.4. The results in columns 1 and 3 show the relationship between
a higher long-term debt to asset ratio and the likelihood of dividend payouts to be negative.
This holds post-crisis. However, as columns 2 and 4 show, a higher long-term debt to asset ratio
after the crisis implies a positive likelihood of net share repurchases. This provides evidence
for debt ﬁnanced share repurchases after the recent ﬁnancial crisis. The other interesting
coefﬁcient is the one on Tobin’s Q. The change in sign of the coefﬁcient post-crisis implies
that ﬁrms with more growth opportunities are the ones diverting more resources to dividend
payments and share repurchases. This result provides additional justiﬁcation for the view
expressed earlier that ﬁrm market valuations are likely being driven by investors seeking higher
returns.
11Appendix 3.B presents the probability of sample ﬁrms to continue a payout policy form one quarter to the next
12Given some of the statistical concerns with linear probability models, in appendix 3.C, I report the marginal
effects using a ﬁxed effects logit estimation. However, in the ﬁxed effect logit only ﬁrms which switch between
states are included in the estimation.
13Breusch and Pagan, 1980
14Hausman, 1978
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Table 3.4. Share repurchases or dividends
Random Effects Fixed Effects
Dividends Net share repurchase Dividends Net share repurchase
Mean of dependent variable 0.238 (1) 0.230 (2) 0.238 (3) 0.230 (4)
LTD/TA -0.0752*** -0.178*** -0.0803*** -0.207***
(-20.06) (-30.05) (-21.10) (-31.43)
PC*LTD/TA -0.0248*** 0.0650*** -0.0327*** 0.0499***
(-3.62) (5.77) (-4.75) (4.18)
Sales/TA 0.0398*** -0.00456 0.0166*** -0.0364***
(9.97) (-0.81) (3.97) (-5.03)
Tobin’s Q -0.000222 -0.0148*** 0.000126 -0.0157***
(-0.64) (-26.21) (0.36) (-25.62)
Net Income/TA -0.0374*** 0.0934*** -0.0416*** 0.0882***
(-4.58) (7.06) (-5.05) (6.17)
Market Leverage -0.0248*** -0.0170*** -0.0242*** -0.0177***
(-40.03) (-17.00) (-38.56) (-16.33)
Log Assets 0.0557*** 0.0406*** 0.0468*** 0.0415***
(87.01) (55.41) (65.95) (33.72)
PC*Sales/TA 0.0346*** 0.0552*** 0.0242*** 0.0249**
(5.80) (5.63) (4.03) (2.39)
PC*Tobin’s Q 0.00700*** 0.00727*** 0.00879*** 0.0121***
(8.81) (5.64) (10.93) (8.70)
PC*Net Income/TA 0.300*** 0.296*** 0.307*** 0.215***
(17.29) (10.43) (17.56) (7.10)
PC*Market Leverage -0.0274*** -0.0109*** -0.0274*** -0.00684***
(-19.41) (-4.60) (-19.30) (-2.78)
LM test(Chi2(1)) 6.1e+06*** 2.5e+05***
Hausman test (Chi2(113)) 1358.96*** 943.42***
Firm & Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 366842 366842 366842 366842
This table reports random and ﬁxed effect regressions for the period 1990Q1-2015Q4. Variables are winsorized at 1
and 99 percent. Errors are clustered by ﬁrm.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level
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3.6 Conclusions
In this paper, I have analyzed the behavior of U.S. non-ﬁnancial corporates after the great
recession. The literature has explored the impact of monetary policy in response to the
ﬁnancial crisis and it’s aftermath on asset prices and on ﬁnancing constraints of the real sector.
However there is little evidence on how ﬁrms have reacted to the post-crisis environment.
This paper aims to ﬁll this gap and evaluates how ﬁrms have used the increase in ﬁnancing.
I ﬁrst provide evidence on the increase in real value of balance sheet debt post-crisis and
correspondingly ﬁrm leverage.
Next, I show that this increase in debt has not translated into higher capital expenditures
or growth in PP&E. I provide evidence that ﬁrms have rather opted to modify their capital
structure via payouts to equity holders. I also ﬁnd a negative correlation between growth in
cash holdings and the long-term debt to asset ratio post-crisis. Finally, the likelihood of a
positive net share repurchase is higher for ﬁrms with a larger share of long-term debt on their
balance sheet after the crisis. Also, ﬁrms with higher growth opportunities have chosen larger
payouts. This has been primarily driven by net share repurchases post-crisis.
Overall, the results indicate a signiﬁcant shift in ﬁrm behavior after the great recession. An
increase in leverage not mirrored by an increase in investment but rather an increase in
payouts raises concerns about future earnings and ﬁrm solvency in the event of monetary
policy tightening. I leave this question of interest rate risk on corporate balance sheets as a
result of the increase in long-term debt to future research.
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3.A Appendix: Variable Deﬁnitions
Compustat item names are in parentheses. For variables that are reported year-to-date, quar-
terly values are determined by subtracting the past quarter from the current value15 except for
the ﬁrst quarter.
Total Assets: Book value of assets (atq).
Long-term Debt: Comprises of bonds, mortgages, loans, long-term leases and any obliga-
tions that require interest payments due more than one year from the ﬁrms’ balance sheet
date(dlttq)
Total Debt: Long-term debt(dlttq) = Debt in current liabilities (dlcq)
Cash: Cash and short-term investments and comprises of cash and all readily transferable
securities to cash (cheq).
Sales: Gross amount of sales less any cash discounts, trade discounts, returned sales and credit
allowance to customers (saleq).
Net Income: Net ﬁscal period gain or loss after accounting for discontinued operations, ex-
traordinary items, minority interest and income taxes (niq).
Market value of assets: Liabilities (ltq) + market capitalization (cshoq*prccq).
Tobin’s Q: Market value of assets(ltq + cshoq*prccq)/Book value of assets(atq).
Market leverage: Market value of assets (ltq + cshoq*prccq)/Market capitalization (cshoq*prccq).
Investment: Two measures are used to deﬁne investment,
1. Capital expenditures: Includes expenditures on PP&E, capital leases, construction, lease-
back transactions or reclassiﬁcation of inventory to PP&E (capxy).
2. Property, Plant and Equipment: Net tangible ﬁxed property used in revenue production
excluding accumulated depreciation (ppentq).
Payout to equity holders: Dividend payments (dvpsxq*cshoq) + purchase of common and
preferred stock (prstkcy) - any reduction in the value of redeemable preferred stocks outstand-
ing (pstkrq).
Net share repurchases: Purchase of common and preferred stock(prstkcy)- Sale of common
and preferred stock (sstky).
15For year to date variables, the ﬁscal quarter deﬁnition is used to convert to quarterly frequency.
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3.B Appendix: Payout Transition Probabilities
Table 3.5 resent the transition probabilities for ﬁrms switching in and out of dividend payments
and positive net share repurchases from one quarter to the next. The transition probabili-
ties support the hypothesis that there is a persistence in dividend paying ﬁrms while share
repurchases constitute a more ﬂexible payout policy.
Table 3.5. Transition Probabilities (percentage)
(1) (2)
Positive Payout = Yes Positive Payout = No
Dividend Payment
Positive Payout = Yes 93.87 6.13
Positive Payout = No 97.90 2.10
Net Share Repurchases
Positive Payout = Yes 55.65 44.35
Positive Payout = No 88.41 11.59
3.C Appendix: Payout Likelihood - Logit Regression
Table 3.6 reports the marginal effects from a ﬁxed effects logit estimation. The effects are
consistent with our ﬁnding that a higher long-term debt to asset ratio post-crisis increases the
likelihood of share repurchases.
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Table 3.6. Fixed Effects logit regression
(1) (2)
Dividends Net Share Repurchases
LTD/TA -0.006*** -0.344***
(-0.001) (0.016)
PC*LTD/TA -0.001** 0.089***
(0.006) (0.018)
Sales/TA 0.0003 -0.053***
(0.000) (0.012)
Tobin’s Q -0.0002*** -0.032***
(0.000) (0.002)
Net income/TA 0.018*** 0.319***
(0.003) (0.030)
Market Leverage -0.002*** -0.034***
(0.000) (0.002)
Log Assets 0.004*** 0.069***
(0.001) (0.002)
PC*Sales/TA -0.008* 0.026*
(0.000) (0.015)
PC*Tobin’s Q 0.001*** 0.019***
(0.000) (0.002)
PC*Net Income/TA 0.011*** 0.153***
(0.003) (0.057)
PC*Market Leverage -0.002*** -0.006
(0.000) (0.004)
Firm & Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 138671 334669
This table reports the marginal effects for the ﬁxed effects logit estimation for the
period 1990Q1-2015Q4. Standard errors calculated using the delta method. Variables
are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. Errors are clustered by ﬁrm.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level
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